2. a) In principle, there are no constitutional objections to courts basing rights to information within special legal relationships on the blanket provision of § 242 BGB. The innovational finding of justice through judicial interpretation and development of the law is indispensable in practice and has always been recognised by the Federal Constitutional Court (cf. BVerfGE 34, 269 <287 and 288.>; 49, 304 <318>; 65, 182 <190 and 191.>; 71, 354 <362>; 128, 193 <210>; 132, 99 <127 para. 74>). The fact that in civil law the legislature grants the civil courts especially wide discretion for the development of law in the form of blanket provisions is also not objectionable. From a constitutional law viewpoint, the blanket provisions of civil law enable the civil courts to ensure respect of the protection of fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE 97, 169 <178>; established case-law) and thus to complement the fulfilment of the legislature’s duty to protect fundamental rights. In doing so, the civil courts give practical effect to fundamental rights to such an extent as the legislature alone would not be able to achieve (cf. in particular Ruffert, Vorrang der Verfassung und Eigenständigkeit des Privatrechts, 2001, p. 132,232; Poscher, Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte, 2003, pp. 324 and 325; Herzog/Grzeszick, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 20 VI para. 90 <Dec. 2007>; Michael/Morlok, Grundrechte, 4th ed. 2014, paras. 571 and 572), given the vast diversity of possible cases (cf. BVerfGE 102, 347 <361>).