c) Conversely, if the decisive issue of European Union law is yet to be addressed in the case-law of the ECJ, if it seems possible that the existing case-law does not address the decisive issue exhaustively or if a further development of the ECJ’s case-law does not just appear a remote possibility (incomplete case-law), Art. 101(1) second sentence GG is violated where the court against whose decisions no judicial remedy is available untenably exceeds the margin of assessment necessarily afforded to it (cf. BVerfGE 82, 159 <195 and 196>; 126, 286 <317>; 128, 157 <188>; 129, 78 <106 and 107>; 135, 155 <232 and 233 para. 183>). This applies, in any case, if the regular courts arbitrarily assume the existence of an “acte clair” or an “acte éclairé”. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the court to sufficiently research the relevant substantive European Union law. Where case-law of the ECJ is applicable to the case at hand, it must be analysed and reflected in the decision rendered by the court (cf. BVerfGE 82, 159 <196>; 128, 157 <189>; 135, 155 <233 para. 184>). On this basis, when applying and interpreting the relevant substantive European Union law (cf. BVerfGE 135, 155 <233 para. 184>), the regular court must reach the reasonable conclusion that the applicable legal standards are either clear from the outset (“acte clair”) or clarified beyond reasonable doubts in the case-law of the ECJ (“acte éclairé”; cf. BVerfGE 129, 78 <107>; 135, 155 <233 para. 184>). In case the issue has not yet been fully resolved, Art. 267(3) TFEU is certainly applied in an untenable manner if the regular court concludes that the legal situation is clear from the outset or clarified beyond reasonable doubts, without providing objective reasons supporting its conclusion (cf. BVerfGE 82, 159 <196>; 135, 155 <233 para. 185>).