Headnotes (non-official):
Article 97 of the Basic Law is no fundamental right within the meaning of § 90 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act. Therefore, a violation of Article 97 of the Basic Law as such cannot be claimed by means of a constitutional complaint. However, the Federal Constitutional Court has already recognised that judges as a special group belonging to the civil service are also covered by the scope of Article 33.5 of the Basic Law, which protects the traditional principles of the professional civil service. Article 33.5 of the Basic Law accords the judges individual rights similar to fundamental rights to the extent that one can prove the existence of traditional principles of the law on the judicial office which the legislator would have to observe and which shape the personal legal status of judges. These principles in particular include the principle of personal independence and independence in judicial decision-making. However, the traditional principles of the law on the judicial office under Article 33.5 of the Basic Law can only contain such guarantees as protected by the independence of the judiciary within the meaning of Article 97 of the Basic Law.
All judges are guaranteed independence in judicial decision-making by Article 97.1 of the Basic Law. According to Article 97.1 of the Basic Law, judges are free from instructions; judicial independence in judicial decision-making is institutionally protected by the guarantee of personal independence pursuant to Article 97.2 of the Basic Law. The statutory provisions on the loss of the judicial position if convicted and on the removal from office in the course of formal disciplinary proceedings are compatible with Article 97.2 of the Basic Law because the premature end of judicial duties results from „a judicial decision “ and on grounds and within the form provided by law.
As a rule, the independence in judicial decision-making guaranteed in Article 97.1 of the Basic Law only covers the relationship of the judiciary to non-judicial public authority. Therefore, a statute that requires a judge to follow another court’s decision does not violate the judge’s independence in judicial decision-making. Due to the independence in judicial decision-making guaranteed under Article 97.1 of the Basic Law, a judge may base his or her decisions on his own legal views, even if all other courts – including those at higher tiers – take the opposite view where no binding effect of another court’s decision is provided by statute. It is constitutive of the independence of judges that the administration of justice is not uniform.
However, pursuant to Article 20.3 of the Basic Law the judiciary is bound by law and statute. The judge, who is subject to statutory law, is not impaired in his or her independence guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 97.1 of the Basic Law) by being bound this way, as such binding effect derives from the rule of law. Both being bound by the law and being subject to statutory law shape and specify the exercise of judicial power entrusted to the judges (Article 92 of the Basic Law). Against this background, it is precisely the requirement that courts only base their decisions on law and statutes that the judicial independence in judicial decision-making guaranteed under Article 97.1 of the Basic Law is meant to ensure compliance with.
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Summary:
I.
The applicant is a former Local Court judge. In that position, he was subject to disciplinary proceedings for having produced too little output and for having used the official court letterhead to complain about unsatisfactory street cleaning vis-à-vis the senior mayor of the town. Since 1997 he worked in the Local Court’s administrative offences division. Since about 2002 he felt overburdened with work. However, for lack of objective grounds, work overload was not official confirmed. In 2010 and 2012, the applicant notified the Director of the Local Court of his condition. The subjective feeling of being overburdened also derived from health problems. In the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, a psychiatrist diagnosed traits of an anancastic personality disorder. However, the applicant did not submit to sufficient treatment for his health problems. Therefore, his general psychological condition deteriorated continually.
Already before 2005 the applicant reprimanded administrative authorities competent for administrative fining for not submitting the relevant measurement reports with the files in the context of proceedings relating to, e.g., speeding. He also informed them that he intended to render “different decisions” if they would not submit those reports in the future. Between 2006 and 2008, the applicant acquitted several accused in similar proceedings where the measurement reports were not in the files. In his reasons, he argued that he was unable to verify the correctness of the measurements for lack of measurement reports. In his view, this presented an impediment to proceedings. In several cases, the Higher Regional Court reversed such decisions. The applicant then treated the cases remanded to him as required. In 2011 the applicant again acquitted several accused for lack of measurement reports or calibration certificates in proceedings for speeding, driving through red lights and for exceeding permissible maximum weights for vehicles. In his reasoning, he stated that the Higher Regional Court, in its pas decisions, had failed to recognise the function of the judicial duty to investigate and had reversed the roles of investigating authorities and courts. He further stated that it was not the court’s task to remedy the deficiencies in administrative file management but rather to ensure procedural “equality of arms” for the person concerned.
As a consequence of these decisions, he was indicted for perversion of justice in 2011 but acquitted by the competent Regional Court in 2013. The Federal Court of Justice reversed that decision and remanded it to the Regional Court. In the following decision, the applicant was convicted for perversion of justice on seven counts.
In his constitutional complaint, he challenged the Federal Court of Justice’s decision and his conviction for perversion of the course of justice by the Regional Court. He asserted that his right to judicial independence had been violated.
II.
The Federal Constitutional Court did not admit the constitutional complaint for decision, as the admission criteria under § 93a.2 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act were not met. In addition, it held that the constitutional complaint was unfounded.
The decision is based on the following considerations:
The challenged decisions are not objectionable under constitutional law. There was no violation of judicial independence. The applicant was bound by law and statutes pursuant to Article 20.3 of the Constitution. However, in his decisions, the applicant resorted to considerations other than law and statutes alone. In particular, he at least partially also pursued the aim of disciplining the authorities competent for administrative fining and the prosecution.
In addition, while not every misconduct by a judge that results from chronic work overload fulfils the constituent elements of a perversion of justice, the applicant’s untenable application of the law was not solely based on such work overload. While chronic work overload can be taken into account in individual cases, it was not relevant in the applicant’s case.
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