Order of 21 May 2026

R e a s o n s :

A. 

1

With their constitutional complaints, the complainants challenge § 184l of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB), which imposes criminal punishment for the sale, purchase or possession of childlike sex dolls. They seek a finding that the provision is void.

I.

2

1. § 184l of the Criminal Code was introduced by the Act to Combat Sexual Violence Against Children (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung sexualisierter Gewalt gegen Kinder) of 22 June 2021 (Federal Law Gazette, Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl I p. 1810) and took effect on 1 July 2021. In addition to the insertion of § 184l of the Criminal Code, the Act provided for a further tightening of the criminal law governing sexual offences relating to children and for an expansion of the investigative powers available under criminal procedural law in this area (cf. Bundestag document, Bundestagsdrucksache – BTDrucks 19/23707, pp. 22 ff.).

3

a) § 184l of the Criminal Code reads as follows:

Putting into circulation, procurement and possession of childlike sex dolls¹

(1) ¹Whoever

1. produces, offers or advertises a physical replica of a child or a part of a child’s body which is intended, by its nature, for use in the performance of sexual acts, or

2. trades in a replica as designated in no. 1 or brings it into or through the territorial scope of this statute for that purpose or

3. sells, delivers or otherwise puts into circulation a replica as designated in no. 1, without trading therein,

incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine.

²Sentence 1 does not apply if the act is subject to a more severe penalty under § 184b.

(2) ¹Whoever procures, possesses or brings into the territorial scope of this statute a replica as designated in subsection (1) first sentence no. 1 incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. ²Subsection (1) second sentence applies accordingly.

(3) In the cases under subsection (1) first sentence no. 2 and no. 3, the attempt is punishable.

(4) Subsection (1) first sentence no. 3 and subsection (2) do not apply to acts which exclusively serve the purpose of lawfully performing state functions or official or professional duties.

(5)¹Objects relating to an offence are confiscated. ²§ 74a applies.

¹Notified pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ L 241, 17 September 2015, p. 1).

4

b) aa) The prohibition of childlike sex dolls was enacted amid intense social and political debate on improving the protection of children from sexual abuse. The scale of the problem of sexual violence against children had increasingly attracted public attention after various particularly heinous cases of abuse had been uncovered between 2017 and 2020 in the cities of Staufen im Breisgau, Bergisch Gladbach, Lügde and Münster (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 20) and the darknet platform ‘Elysium’ had been exposed in 2017. Moreover, a public debate had been sparked regarding the sale and advertising of childlike sex dolls on online marketplaces (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 23). From the start of 2020 onwards, German-language media increasingly reported on the unrestricted availability of childlike sex dolls on marketplaces such as Amazon and Shein. The potential danger of actual abuse arising from the use of childlike sex dolls was addressed in media reporting, where, for example, the spokesman of the prevention network ‘Kein Täter werden’, Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus Beier, Director of the Institute of Sexology and Sexual Medicine at Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin set out his views. He stated that there was a legitimate concern that the use of such dolls could lead to a relaxation of behavioural control, because it brought affected persons closer to the reality they longed for. He said that they saw a child with whom the desired sexual contacts could be realised and who was willing to do everything; paedophiles could also use childlike sex dolls to rehearse behavioural sequences ([…]). In a video produced by ‘Y-Kollektiv’ (ARD) on childlike sex dolls dated 7 May 2020 ([…]), he was asked whether it would be likely that the use of a childlike sex doll would lower inhibitions about real abuse of actual children or whether the contrary would be true. He stated the following:

According to our assessment, based on the few patients we work with, this is not the case. However: From a clinical perspective, I am always concerned that direct acts with a comparable object adversely affect the distorted perception of users, which is a risk factor.

5

The coordinator of the network ‘Kein Täter werden’ in Ulm made similar statements in the TV series ‘AKTE’ (SAT. 1) on 24 August 2020 ([…]). She said that from a therapeutical perspective, the use of such dolls was a problem, because their repeated use may lead to such behaviour becoming automatic or creeping in. All seven patients surveyed believed that childlike sex dolls could not help them avoid committing real child abuse.

6

At the Land level, this debate led to calls on Land Governments to advocate within the Bundesrat for a comprehensive prohibition, backed by criminal penalties, on the import, trade, purchase, possession and distribution of childlike sex dolls. […]

7

bb) During the legislative process at the federal level, different views were expressed on the question whether the use of childlike sex dolls increases the risk of a user actually abusing a child. As empirical data was largely lacking, only limited scientific insights were available on the effects of the existence and use of childlike sex dolls. According to a document of the Bundestag’s Research Services finalised on 3 August 2020, some experts held the view – which could not be empirically proven – that childlike sex dolls might offer individuals with such inclinations a means of effectively acting on their urges, which could reduce the risk of criminal offences in this area. For the most part, however, it was seen as plausible that the use of such sex dolls for sexual practices might lower inhibitions and would lead to escalation, increasing the risk that individuals with such inclinations would go on to actually abuse children. According to the document, there were frequent calls for empirical research on the question; however, at the time there were no studies regarding the effects of childlike sex dolls ([…]).

8

To the extent that relevant academic publications were available, they were mostly from the fields of ethics, philosophy, criminology and psychology. Some of these supported the prohibition of childlike sex dolls ([…]), or, in any case, emphasised the risks that such dolls pose ([…]). Some publications also pointed out that it is considered best practice in therapy for paedophiles to encourage them not to act on their sexual impulses ([…]). However, some publications were (generally) sceptical about a prohibition and highlighted the need for more research ([…]).

9

cc) Initial studies based on user surveys regarding the psychological and risk-based effects of the possession of childlike sex dolls were published after the conclusion of the legislative process. They criticise prohibition. One such study did not find any evidence that the possession of childlike sex dolls is associated with a higher risk of child sexual abuse, nor did the study find specific evidence that such dolls could protect against such risks ([…]). In another study published in 2026, the same authors conclude that the use of fictional sexual materials relating to children – including childlike sex dolls – by paedophiles and the resulting sexual satisfaction may be associated with a lower risk of child sexual abuse ([…]). A study based on a survey of affected individuals published in 2024 concludes that no factors could be identified that indicate a higher risk following from the use of dolls, although it could not be concluded from the data that such dolls ultimately protect children ([…]).

10

According to the UK’s National Crime Agency, in 75% of cases where the discovery of a childlike sex doll led to a search, digital child pornography was also found in the suspect’s home ([…]).

11

c) aa) On 27 October 2020, the CDU/CSU and SPD parliamentary groups introduced the Draft Act to Combat Sexual Violence Against Children (BTDrucks 19/23707) into the Bundestag. This draft act identifies combating sexual violence against children as one of the most pressing social policy issues of our time and as a key task of the state; it states that amending and adding to the relevant criminal offences is necessary in light of new technological developments. The draft act seeks to improve the protection of children from sexual abuse through an array of measures, including preventive measures in particular (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 1).

12

One element of the proposed legislative measures was the creation of a criminal provision that imposes punishment for the sale, purchase or possession of childlike sex dolls. According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft act, § 184l of the Criminal Code is to apply as a subsidiary provision to § 184b of the Criminal Code (distribution, procurement and possession of child pornographic content) and close gaps in the criminal law for cases which do not meet the prerequisites to establish an offence related to child pornographic content. Unlike § 184b, § 184l is designed to also include merely fictional representations and replicas without restriction (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, pp. 23, 42). The memorandum goes on to state that replicas of a child or a part of a child’s body which are intended for use in the performance of sexual acts are increasingly faithful reproductions of children and are primarily offered via common market platforms, facilitating their purchase and allowing for easy access. On occasion, they are advertised very openly. The draft act’s primary aim is to deprive the market for such replicas of its basis. But it also serves to incriminate possession as well as preparatory acts such as manufacturing, import, supply and advertising, because these contribute to stimulating the market, which considerably increases demand for such replicas (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 23).

13

The reasons provided for the draft act were that there is a risk that childlike sex dolls lower inhibitions regarding sexual violence against children and thus indirectly contribute to such violence. The use of such objects may bring about or intensify the desire to perform the sexual acts for which the dolls are used by abusing real children. This increases children’s risk of becoming victims of sexual violence, which is unacceptable (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, pp. 23, 42). With regard to § 184l(2) of the Criminal Code, the explanatory memorandum states that the punishment of purchase, possession and bringing into or through the territorial scope of the law for personal use also appears tenable on criminal policy grounds because it has to be feared that even individuals who import, purchase or possess such a replica solely for personal use will be tempted by such use to commit sexual violence against children (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 43).

14

According to the legislator, the new provision is intended to send a clear message to society that children – even mere physical replicas of children – must not be turned into objects of sexual behaviour (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 23).

15

bb) During the first reading of the draft act, the proposed introduction of § 184l of the Criminal Code was the subject of heated debate ([…]). Following this debate, the Federal Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection, in the context of Federal Government question time on 4 November 2020, stated that she had opted to give clear precedence to the protection of children given the complex situation where no findings regarding the effects of childlike sex dolls were available, and that the possession of childlike sex dolls would therefore be criminalised ([…]).

16

cc) On 2 December 2020, the Federal Government’s Draft Act to Combat Sexual Violence against Children – which corresponded to the draft act of the CDU/CSU and SPD parliamentary groups – was submitted to the German Bundestag (BTDrucks 19/24901). In the context of further deliberation of the draft acts in the responsible Committee for Legal Affairs and Consumer Protection, eight experts were heard in the public hearing on 7 December 2020 ([…]).

17

Of the six experts that (also) addressed the proposed new provision in § 184l of the Criminal Code, four rejected the proposed provision; these were: Prof. Dr. Tatjana Hörnle, M.A. (Rutgers) (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg/Breisgau, Head of the Department of Criminal Law), Prof. Dr. Jörg Kinzig (Eberhard Karl University Tübingen, Director of the Institute for Criminology, Chair of Criminology, Criminal Law and Penalty Law), Dr. Jenny Lederer (specialist criminal lawyer, Essen) and Dr. Leonie Steinl, LL.M. (Columbia) (German Female Lawyers’ Association, Deutscher Juristinnenbund e.V. Berlin) ([…]). One expert, Prof. Dr. Jörg Eisele (Eberhard Karl University Tübingen), Chair of German and European Criminal and Criminal Procedural Law, White Collar Crime and Cybercrime Law), leaned towards criticism ([…]). The experts who rejected the draft § 184l raised doubts as to the existence of sufficient empirical data for the assumption that the use of childlike sex dolls actually increases (at least indirectly) the risk to children. They stated that they could not endorse the introduction of such a criminal offence, given that criminal law may only be used as a last resort and there was no proof that [childlike sex dolls] actually endangered legal interests.

18

By contrast, Dr. Julia Bussweiler (Public Prosecutor General’s Office Frankfurt/Main, Central Unit for Combatting Cybercrime, public prosecutor) endorsed the proposed § 184l of the Criminal Code ([…]). She explained that childlike sex dolls were increasingly being seized in the context of investigations into child sexual abuse. The analysis of the abuse network Bergisch Gladbach had clearly shown that childlike sex dolls had been used to practise acts later committed against children. While no final empirical findings were available to the law enforcement agencies, the results of investigations so far suggested that there was at least a risk that the use of childlike sex dolls reduced inhibitions of paedophiles to carry out actual child abuse.

19

dd) The Federal Bar Association (Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer) ([…]) and the North Rhine-Westphalia regional chapter of the Working Group of Social Democratic Lawyers (Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Juristinnen und Juristen – ASJ NRW) also rejected the provision in their statements on the draft act. The Federal Bar Association argued that this was ultimately more a matter of penalising offensive and ‘morally reprehensible’ behaviour than of protecting legal interest, and criminal law should never criminalise mere breaches of moral or ethical standards. The North Rhine-Westphalia Working Group of Social Democratic Lawyers submitted that the planned introduction of § 184l of the Criminal Code was not appropriate under the rule of law as it constituted moralising criminal law; the hypothesis that owners and users of sex dolls would be tempted to commit child sexual abuse because such dolls lowered inhibitions to commit sexual violence against children could not be proven by the relevant empirical research. Under the rule of law, criminal law serves to protect legal interests and should not be used as a means to combat unethical conduct.

20

ee) On the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Consumer Protection (cf. BTDrucks 19/27928), the German Bundestag adopted the draft act in the version proposed by the Committee – which remained unchanged from the original draft with regard to § 184l of the Criminal Code – in its second and third readings on 25 March 2021, with the votes of the coalition parliamentary groups (CDU/CSU and SPD) and the AfD parliamentary group, whilst the remaining three opposition parliamentary groups abstained ([…]).

21

2. Before the introduction of § 184l of the Criminal Code, sex dolls as such had not been regulated under criminal law or otherwise prohibited by law in Germany. That said, certain uses of childlike sex dolls could be treated as criminal offences under § 184b of the Criminal Code (until 31 December 2020: ‘Dissemination, procurement and possession of child pornographic documents’, since 1 January 2021: ‘Dissemination, procurement and possession of child pornographic content’; cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 23). The Bundestag’s Research Services found that it could not be ruled out that pornographic images or other representations showing sexual acts involving a childlike sex doll, the depiction of a childlike sex doll that is wholly or partially unclothed in an unnaturally sexual posture, or the sexually provocative depiction of the unclothed genitals or buttocks of a childlike sex doll might fall within the scope of §184b(1) no. 1 of the Criminal Code ([…]). However, there was no case-law to this effect. According to the Bundestag’s Research Services, there were no known cases of law enforcement agencies carrying out investigations relating to childlike sex dolls prior to the entry into force of § 184l of the Criminal Code.

22

3. As yet, there has hardly been any case-law on § 184l of the Criminal Code. Case numbers in recent police crime statistics are in the low to mid double-digits ([…]).

II.

23

1. There are currently no express requirements under international law for provisions criminalising the marketing, purchase or possession of childlike sex dolls. Art. 3(1)(c) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child), which entered into force for Germany on 15 August 2009 (cf. BGBl II 2011 p. 1288), on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography of 25 May 2000 (BGBl II 2008 p. 1222) and Art. 20(1)(a) through (f) of the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 25 October 2007 (BGBl II 2015 p. 26, Lanzarote Convention), which entered into force for Germany on 1 March 2016, require Germany as a signatory to penalise the production, distribution, dissemination, import, export, offering, sale or possession of child pornography. Whether childlike sex dolls fall under the definition of child pornography in Art. 2(c) of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and/or Art. 20(2) of the Lanzarote Convention has not been finally determined, but tends to be answered in the negative ([…]).

24

2. At EU level, Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, is currently being revised. According to the reasons given in the Commission’s proposal for the directive (cf. European Commission, 6 February 2024 COM <2024> 60 final, p. 23) and the additions made by the Council (cf. Council of the European Union, 13 December 2024, interinstitutional file 2024/0035<COD>, 16791/24, pp. 10, 55), the definition of child sexual abuse material in Art. 2 no. 3(b) and (d) of the recast directive, which in its Art. 5 contains corresponding obligations for the Member States to impose punishment, is intended to cover childlike sex dolls. The legislative procedure has not been concluded yet.

25

3. Internationally, the law regarding the criminalisation of the sale, purchase or possession of childlike sex dolls is inconsistent.

26

Several national legal orders contain a specific prohibition of childlike sex dolls. For example, Australia adopted the Combatting Child Sexual Exploitation Legislation Amendment Act 2019 No. 72 in 2019, inserting Art. 273A.1 into the Australian Criminal Code, a criminal provision that expressly targets childlike sex dolls ([…]). Similar provisions entered into force in Denmark ([…]) in 2022 and in the Netherlands ([…]) in 2025. In the United States, specific criminal offences currently exist in several states that (also) target childlike sex dolls ([…]). A bill for a prohibition at the federal level was most recently introduced in Congress in 2025 but has not yet been adopted ([…]). In other legal orders that do not expressly address how to handle childlike sex dolls, certain acts relating to childlike sex dolls may be covered by the relevant criminal provisions on child pornography ([…]).

III.

27

The constitutional complaints received by the Court on 22 June 2022 largely have the same content. The complainants assert that § 184l of the Criminal Code violates their general right of personality in the form of the right to sexual self-determination and their right to physical integrity. Moreover, the complainants claim violations of the prohibition on disadvantaging on the basis of disability and of the requirement of specificity.

28-50

[…]

IV.

51

The German Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Federal Government (the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Justice) as well as all Land Governments were given the opportunity to submit a statement pursuant to § 94(4) in conjunction with § 77 no. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG).

52

1. With the exception of the Federal Ministry of Justice, the parties entitled to submit a statement did not do so.

53

2. The Federal Ministry of Justice submitted a statement on behalf of the Federal Government.

54-67

[…]

B. 

68

The constitutional complaints, which were lodged in due form and time, are admissible (see I. below), but unfounded (see II. below).

I.

69

1. As a statutory provision, § 184l of the Criminal Code can be admissibly challenged in constitutional complaint proceedings pursuant to Art. 94(1) no. 4a of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) in conjunction with § 90(1) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act.

70

2. Both complainants have standing in accordance with § 90(1) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act.

71

a) For a constitutional complaint against legislation to be admissible, the complainants’ fundamental rights must be individually, presently and directly affected by the challenged provision (cf. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE 1, 97 <101>; 97, 157 <164>; 102, 197 <206>) and the asserted violation of rights that can be challenged by constitutional complaint (Art. 94a(1) no. 4a of the Basic Law, § 90(1) Federal Constitutional Court Act) must appear possible based on the complainants’ submissions (cf. BVerfGE 28, 17 <19>; 89, 155 <171>; 112, 363 <366>; 125, 39 <73>; 162, 1 <51 f. paras. 93 ff.> – Bavarian Protection of the Constitution Act; 163, 43 <72 paras. 83 ff.> – Federal Protection of the Constitution Act – Data sharing powers; […]).

72

Complainants are individually affected if they are addressed by the provision. Complainants are presently affected if the challenged provision has current, and not just virtual, effects on their legal position, if the legislation in question, in view of its future effects, compels those addressed to make decisions that cannot subsequently be corrected or if it is evidently foreseeable that and how complainants will be affected by the legislation in the future. Finally, complainants are directly affected if the challenged provision effects changes to their legal position without requiring any further implementation measure. This must also be presumed to be the case if the provision prompts those addressed to make arrangements that cannot be subsequently corrected before specific implementation measures take effect (cf. BVerfGE 1, 97 <101 ff.>; 97, 157 <164>; 102, 197 <206 f.>; 119, 181 <212>).

73

If complainants are not addressed by the challenged provision as it is addressed to third parties, they are nevertheless individually affected if the provision does not merely affect them as a reflex, but in a way that is legally relevant (cf. BVerfGE 13, 230 <232 f.>; 78, 350 <354>; 108, 370 <384>; 121, 317 <344 f.>; 125, 39 <75>; 125, 260 <304 f.>; 130, 151 <176>; 146, 71 <109 para. 112>; 153, 182 <257 para. 195> – Assisted suicide). In particular, complainants are affected in such a legally relevant manner if a prohibition addressed to third parties indirectly aims to restrict the freedom of fundamental right holders who are not addressed by the provision (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <257 para. 195>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 11 August 1999 - 1 BvR 2181/98 inter alia -, para. 48).

74

b) Based on these standards, the complainants have standing with regard to § 184l of the Criminal Code in its entirety. In particular, the complainants can assert that they are individually, presently and directly affected with regard to one of their rights whose violation can be challenged by constitutional complaint pursuant to Art. 94(1) no. 4a of the Basic Law and § 90(1) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act – in particular, their general right of personality in the form of the right to sexual self-determination following from Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law (cf. para. 91). Based on their submissions, a violation of their fundamental rights also appears possible.

75

aa) Both complainants are individually, presently and directly affected with regard to § 184l(2) first sentence of the Criminal Code, complainant no. 2 is also affected with regard to § 184l(1) first sentence no. 1 first alternative of the Criminal Code. Both complainants assert that they want to acquire and possess a childlike sex doll. § 184l(2) first sentence of the Criminal Code prohibits such conduct. Complainant no. 2 also submits that he wants to manufacture such a sex doll for himself according to his own wishes and that he was forced to abandon this work when the challenged law entered into force. The manufacturing of a childlike sex doll may be prohibited under § 184l(1) first sentence no. 1 first alternative of the Criminal Code, including for personal use ([…]). Thus, there is a least the risk of criminal sanctions. To this extent, the complainants are therefore affected as addressees of the prohibitions of § 184l of the Criminal Code.

76

bb) The complainants are also affected in a legally relevant manner by the (other) variations in which the constituent elements of § 184l(1) first sentence of the Criminal Code may lead to criminal sanctions. They do not assert that they themselves want to carry out the acts punishable under that provision, in particular ‘market-related’ acts; they are therefore not directly affected in legal terms. That said, they are in fact affected by these prohibitions, as these make it at least considerably more difficult, or even impossible, to (again) procure childlike sex dolls for personal use. In this respect, the complainants are not just affected as a reflex. This is because the aim of criminalisation of (sale-related) acts under § 184l(1) first sentence nos. 1 through 3 of the Criminal Code, which is drying up the market for such replicas (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 2), (also) pursues the stated purpose of preventing the use of childlike sex dolls by purchasers, which the legislator considers to be potentially dangerous (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 42; cf. para. 13).

77-81

[…]

II.

82

The criminal provision of § 184l of the Criminal Code is compatible with the Basic Law. The provision does not violate the complainants’ general right of personality following from Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law, nor does it violate their right to liberty of the person following from Art. 2(2) second sentence in conjunction with Art. 104(1) of the Basic Law (see 1. below). Moreover, it does not violate the complainants’ right to physical integrity (Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law) (see 2. below), nor the prohibition on disadvantaging on the basis of disability (Art. 3(3) second sentence of the Basic Law) or the general guarantee of the right to equality (Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law) (see 3. and 4. below). The provision is also compatible with the requirement of specificity following from Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law (see 5. below).

83

1. Contrary to the complainants’ view, § 184l of the Criminal Code violates neither their general right of personality in its manifestation as the right to sexual self-determination nor their right to liberty of the person.

84

a) § 184l of the Criminal Code falls within the scope of protection of the complainants’ general right of personality under Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law. Insofar as the offences in § 184l(1) first sentence no. 1 first alternative of the Criminal Code (complainant no. 2) and § 184l(2) first sentence of the Criminal Code (both complainants) carry a penalty of imprisonment, the complainants’ fundamental right to liberty of the person under Art. 2(2) second sentence in conjunction with Art. 104(1) of the Basic Law is also affected (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <307 para. 332> with further references).

85

aa) The general right of personality protects the closer personal sphere (engere persönliche Lebenssphäre) as well as its basic conditions, which cannot be entirely protected by the traditional specific freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution (cf. BVerfGE 54, 148 <153>; 72, 155 <170>; 79, 256 <268>; 96, 56 <61>; 121, 69 <90>; 146, 1 <46 para. 102>). The right to the free development of one’s personality and human dignity guarantee every individual an autonomous domain of private life in which they can develop and protect their individuality (cf. BVerfGE 35, 202 <220>; 79, 256 <268>; 117, 202 <225>; 146, 1 <46 para. 102>). The fundamental right serves the purpose of protecting aspects of one's personality that are not covered by the specific freedoms of the Basic Law, but are equal to these freedoms in terms of their constitutive significance for one’s personality (cf. BVerfGE 54, 148 <153>; 153, 182 <260 para. 205>; 158, 131 <159 para. 71> – Advance healthcare directive in psychiatric confinement; 159, 223 <278 para. 113> – Federal pandemic emergency brake I <curfews and contact restrictions>; 170, 178 <202 para. 42> – Law on names; adult adoption; 172, 46 <88 para. 106> – Trojan I; established case-law). Such a guarantee that fills gaps in protection is necessary in particular with regard to new risks to the development of personality, which for the most part arise in the context of scientific and technological advances (cf. BVerfGE 54, 148 <153>; 65, 1 <41>; 101, 361 <380>; 106, 28 <39>; 118, 168 <183>; 120, 274 <303>). Determining what specific legal protection is sought in relation to the various aspects of the right of personality must therefore mainly be informed by the type of risk to one’s personality, which follows from the specific circumstances of the case at hand (cf. BVerfGE 101, 361 <380>).

86

The general right of personality also encompasses the protection of the private sphere (cf. BVerfGE 101, 361 <382>; 120, 180 <199>). In particular, this protection concerns matters that fundamental right holders typically do not wish to discuss or expose (cf. BVerfGE 120, 180 <199>), because their discussion or display in public is regarded as unseemly, because they are regarded as embarrassing if they become known, or because they provoke negative reactions from one’s social environment, as is the case in matters such as sexuality in particular. Without any protection against others obtaining knowledge thereof, sexual development would be severely impaired even though it is protected by fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE 101, 361 <382> with further references; 138, 377 <387 para. 29>). The right to respect for one’s private sphere specifically protects the right not to have to disclose sexual relations with a partner, but to decide oneself whether, how and to whom to disclose information relating to one’s intimate sphere and sex life (cf. BVerfGE 96, 56 <61>; 117, 202 <233>; 138, 377 <387 para. 29>; 141, 186 <211 f. para. 58>). The private sphere also includes a person’s refuge, the place where they are free from public observation and the self-control imposed by it, where they can relax and even let go (cf. BVerfGE 101, 361 <382 ff.>; 120, 180 <199>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 5 April 2000 - 1 BvR 2479/97 -, para. 4) and where they can satisfy their need ‘to be left alone’ (cf. BVerfGE 27, 1 <6 f.>; 120, 180 <199>; regarding Art. 13 of the Basic Law cf. BVerfGE 32, 54 <75>; 51, 97 <107>; 165, 1 <70, 72 paras. 130, 134>). The boundaries of the protected private sphere cannot be established in general and abstract terms (cf. BVerfGE 101, 361 <384>; 120, 180 <199>).

87

The Basic Law protects a person’s intimate and sexual sphere as part of their private sphere under Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law. This includes that individuals can determine their own sexuality and sexual relations with a partner and that they can in principle decide themselves whether, within which limits and to what ends to accept influences by others (cf. BVerfGE 47, 46 <73 f.>; 60, 123 <134>; 88, 87 <97>; 96, 56 <61>; 120, 224 <238 f.>). The protection of sexual self-determination encompasses different aspects, such as the recognition of one’s personal gender identity, the protection of sexual integrity, as well as its development through sexual activity. The differentiation put forward in legal scholarship, according to which sexual behaviour is merely protected as a specific guarantee under the general freedom of action ([…]), does not sufficiently take into account that the general right of personality also protects personality development ([…]). Since the free expression of one’s own sexuality does not necessarily require sexual contact with a partner, the right to sexual self-determination also protects autoerotic practices as a distinct expression of sexuality.

88

While the general right of personality is not guaranteed without reservation and individuals must in principle tolerate state measures that serve overriding public interests or the constitutionally protected interests of others as long as these measures satisfy the requirements arising from the principle of proportionality (cf. BVerfGE 27, 344 <351>; 65, 1 <44>; 96, 56 <61>; 120, 224 <239>; 153, 182 <267 para. 221>; cf. paras. 99 ff.), the Federal Constitutional Court has recognised an absolutely protected core of private life that is beyond the reach of public authority and in respect of which a balancing of interests cannot justify interference (cf. BVerfGE 80, 367 <373>; 90, 145 <171>; 109, 279 <313>; 119, 1 <29 f.>; 120, 224 <239>; 130, 1 <22>). The determination of whether a matter falls within the inviolable core of private life depends on whether it is highly personal in terms of content, and thus also on how and to what extent the matter affects the sphere of others or interests of the common good; the specific circumstances of the individual case are decisive in this respect (cf. BVerfGE 34, 238 <248>; 80, 367 <374>; 109, 279 <314 f.>; 120, 224 <239>; 124, 43 <69 f.>; 130, 1 <22>). In particular, the inviolable core of private life encompasses expressions of sexuality (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 <314 f.>; 119, 1 <29 f.>; 130, 1 <22>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 10 June 2009 - 1 BvR 1107/09 -, para. 26).

89

However, sexuality is not automatically and in every case part of the core of private life. While the core of private life generally includes the freedom to keep preferred forms of sexual expression to oneself and to experience them in a space that is beyond the reach of the state, not every form of sexual activity contains intimate elements that are protected by the general right of personality’s core of private life. The absolute protection of the core of private life does not extend to sexual activity which encroaches on another person‘s sexual self-determination or physical integrity (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 10 June 2009 - 1 BvR 1107/09 -, para. 26).

90

bb) According to these standards, it is true that the scope of protection of the general right of personality in the form of the right to sexual self-determination (Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law) is affected by the provision (see (1) below). However, the inviolable core of private life is not affected (see (2) below).

91

(1) Firstly, § 184l of the Criminal Code deprives potential users of childlike sex dolls of the actual means of obtaining such dolls by removing supply (§ 184l(1) first sentence Criminal Code). Secondly, the use of such dolls is rendered impossible by the fact that users are prohibited, with non-compliance subject to punishment, from any conduct typically associated with such use; this concerns the purchase and possession of such dolls in particular (§ 184l(2) Criminal Code). Although the use of dolls as such is not punishable, the provision, at least with regard to its outcome, also influences autoerotic acts. It is irrelevant in this respect whether – not least due to the varied possibilities of using childlike sex dolls – all possible substitute acts and satisfactions of a paedophile or hebephile living together with a childlike sex doll in a manner resembling a relationship can be categorised as sexual matters. In any case, the prohibitions on the use of childlike sex dolls especially affect masturbatory practices using a specific prop. Thus, the provision affects the complainants’ freedom to decide themselves how they want to engage in sexual activity, and thereby the scope of protection of the general right of personality in its manifestation as the right to sexual self-determination.

92

(2) However, the prohibitions under § 184l of the Criminal Code do not affect the core of private life, in respect of which a balancing of interests cannot justify interference. It was permissible for the legislator to assume that the use of childlike sex dolls for sexual acts in itself puts children at risk and, in particular, that it increases the risk of children actually being abused (cf. paras. 114 ff.). The use of childlike sex dolls – even in private and without the presence of others – thus has an effect on other peoples’ s personality sphere, and therefore social implications, which remove it from the core of private life.

93

b) § 184l of the Criminal Code interferes with the scope of protection of the complainants’ general right of personality in its manifestation as the right to sexual self-determination as defined above.

94

aa) In its case-law, the Federal Constitutional Court has recognised that fundamental rights protection is not limited to interferences that are directly addressed to the persons affected by them. Even state measures with an indirect or factual impact can amount to impairments of fundamental rights and must therefore be sufficiently justified under constitutional law. As regards their objective and effects, such measures can be equivalent to a direct interference provided for by law and must then be treated in the same way (cf. BVerfGE 110, 177 <191>; 153, 182 <265 f. paras. 214 ff.>).

95

bb) Based thereon, all offences set out in § 184l of the Criminal Code interfere with the complainants’ general right of personality in its manifestation as the right to sexual self-determination.

96

(1) The prohibitions on the purchase and possession of childlike sex dolls in particular (§ 184l(2) first sentence Criminal Code) are directly addressed to the complainants. In respect of complainant no. 2, this also applies to § 184l(1) first sentence first alternative of the Criminal Code if this provision also covers manufacture for personal use (cf. para. 75). While the provisions do not prohibit the use for sexual purposes as such, this does not preclude the assumption that they result in interference with the right to sexual self-determination. This is because the provisions, and above all the prohibition on possession, concern acts that are typically prerequisites for using childlike sex dolls for sexual purposes, some exceptions notwithstanding.

97

(2) Insofar as the modalities of § 184l(1) first sentence of the Criminal Code targeting the production and provision of childlike sex dolls, as acts preceding possession, are not directly addressed to the complainants, they nevertheless interfere with their right to sexual self-determination due to the aims pursued by them and their indirect and factual effects. The prohibitions targeting the production and provision of childlike sex dolls and the resulting removal of supply of childlike sex dolls (‘drying up the market’) make it at least de facto considerably more difficult for the complainants to use a childlike sex doll as a prop for masturbation, which is conduct that falls within the scope of protection of the general right of personality in its manifestation as the right to sexual self-determination. This is not a mere reflex that is a consequence of a law serving other aims, but in fact constitutes one of the purposes of the law (cf. para. 13).

98

c) The interference with the general right of personality is justified. Restrictions of the general right of personality require a constitutional statutory basis and must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see aa) below). § 184l of the Criminal Code is compatible with the requirements arising therefrom (see bb) below).

99

aa) The general right of personality is not guaranteed without reservation. The individual must tolerate state measures that serve overriding public interests or the constitutionally protected interests of others as long as these measures satisfy the requirements arising from the principle of proportionality (cf. BVerfGE 27, 344 <351>; 65, 1 <44>; 96, 56 <61>; 120, 224 <239>; 153, 182 <267 para. 221>). With respect to the principle of proportionality, interferences with the general right of personality are subject to stricter justification requirements than interferences with the general freedom of action protected under Art. 2(1) of the Basic Law. These justification requirements are particularly strict for guarantees that have a specific link to the guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law. The guarantees are more extensive the more the individual is affected within their closest private sphere; they diminish the more the individual interacts with the outside world within a social context (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <267 para. 221> with further references).

100

Under the principle of proportionality, a criminal provision must serve the protection of others or the general public (cf. BVerfGE 90, 145 <172, 184>; see also BVerfGE 27, 18 <29 f.>; 39, 1 <46>; 88, 203 <257>; 120, 224 <239>) – in case of a threat of imprisonment, this is also required with regard to the guarantee of liberty of the person under Art. 2(2) second sentence in conjunction with Art. 104(1) of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 90, 145 <172>; also 153, 182 <307 para. 332> with further references). Criminal law is used only as the ‘ultima ratio’ to protect legal interests when certain conduct is not only subject to prohibition but is also particularly harmful to society and intolerable for orderly coexistence, which makes its prevention particularly pressing. Because of the social condemnation expressed through the threat, imposition and enforcement of punishment, the prohibition of excessive measures (Übermaßverbot) is particularly important in the review of a criminal law provision (cf. BVerfGE 88, 203 <257 f.>; 90, 145 <172>; 96, 10 <25>; 120, 224 <239 f.>). In principle, it is for the legislator to make a binding determination of what conduct is to be criminalised (cf. BVerfGE 80, 244 <255> with further references; 90, 145 <173>; 120, 224 <240>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 5 August 2020 - 2 BvR 1985/19, 2 BvR 1986/19 -, para. 37). The legislator is generally free to determine whether to defend a specific legal interest that it considers to be in need of protection through the criminal law and how to do so (cf. BVerfGE 50, 142 <162>; 120, 224 <240>).

101

A provision restricting fundamental rights must be suitable and necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose pursued by it. For a measure to be suitable, it is sufficient that the desired outcome can be furthered with its help. Success is not required in every individual case, nor must it even be possible in every such case. The possibility of achieving the intended purpose is sufficient (cf. BVerfGE 96, 10 <23>; 120, 224 <240>). A law is necessary if the legislator could not have chosen an equally effective measure with no or less restrictive impact on fundamental rights. In determining the suitability and necessity of the chosen measure to achieve the intended goals, as well as in the assessment and prognosis to be undertaken with regard to the danger affecting individuals or the general public, the legislator is afforded a margin of assessment; depending on the specific nature of the matter in question, the legal interests affected and the possibilities of making a sufficiently certain assessment, such determination can only be reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court to a limited extent (cf. BVerfGE 90, 145 <172 f.> with further references; 120, 224 <240>; 156, 63 <116 para. 192> – Electronic monitoring; 160, 284 <334 para. 126> – Illegal street races <§ 315d(1) no. 3 Criminal Code>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Senate of 1 October 2025 - 1 BvR 2428/20 -, para. 162 – Disruptive counter-protest).

102

Finally, the limits of what is reasonable for the addressees of the prohibition must be observed in an overall balancing of the severity of the interference on the one hand, and the weight and urgency of the reasons invoked as justification on the other hand, and the measure must be appropriate in this sense. The measure must not place excessive burdens on those affected by it. In the area of criminal law, the principles of culpability and of proportionality give rise to a requirement that punishment must be proportionate to the severity of the criminal offence and the culpability of the offender. The type and extent of a threat of criminal punishment must not be out of proportion to the criminal conduct. The criminal offence and its legal consequences must be properly aligned (cf. BVerfGE 90, 145 <173> with further references; 120, 224 <241>; 160, 284 <334 para. 126>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Senate of 1 October 2025 - 1 BvR 2428/20 -, para. 162).

103

bb) § 184l of the Criminal Code satisfies these requirements. It serves a legitimate purpose (see (1) below) and is suitable (see (2) below), necessary (see (3) below) and appropriate (see (4) below) to achieve this purpose.

104

(1) (a) Where statutory provisions result in interference with fundamental rights, such interference may only be justified if the legislator is pursuing constitutionally legitimate purposes. Whether this is the case is subject to review by the Federal Constitutional Court (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <269  ff. paras. 227 ff.>; 159, 223 <298 para. 169>; 163, 107 <138 para. 85> – Veterinary prescription requirement).

105

In this respect, the Federal Constitutional Court is not limited to considering only the purposes expressly stated by the legislator itself (cf. BVerfGE 151, 101 <136 para. 89> – Stepchild adoption; 159, 223 <298 para. 169>; 163, 107 <138 para. 86>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 -, para. 110 – Age limit for lawyers commissioned as notaries). It is not decisive for constitutional review whether the material reasons for a law have been expressly stated in the legislative process, or are provided in the explanatory memorandum to the law (cf. BVerfGE 75, 246 <268>; 130, 131 <144>; 163, 107 <138 f. para. 86>). In principle, the Basic Law does not specify any matters for which reasons must be given in the legislative process, nor in what manner and at what time this must be done; rather, it leaves room for negotiation and political compromise (cf. BVerfGE 137, 34 <73 f. para. 77>; 143, 246 <345 para. 279>; 157, 30 <162 f. para. 241>– Climate change; 163, 107 <139 para. 86>; 167, 163 <212 para. 112> – Contergan II). Instead, the requirements following from the Constitution concern the outcome of a legislative process. The decisive factor is that the result of the legislative process does not fail to meet the requirements of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 132, 134 <162 para. 70>; 139, 148 <180 para. 61>; 143, 246 <345 para. 279>; 163, 107 <139 para. 86>; 167, 163 <212 para. 112>).

106

Statutory purpose is therefore typically derived from the objective intent of the legislator. Objective intent is to be determined by recognised methods of legal interpretation, i.e. based on the wording of the provision, the legislative materials and legislative history, the systematic approach and the spirit and purpose. These methods are not mutually exclusive, but instead complement one another (cf. BVerfGE 157, 223 <263 f. para. 106> – Berlin rent cap; 161, 63 <93 para. 57> – Wind farm participatory companies; 167, 163 <213 para. 115>; 170, 293 <343 para. 113> – Statutory requirement of hospitalisation for coercive medical treatment; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 -, para. 110).

107

For laws that the legislator adopts with the aim of tackling situations assumed to endanger either the general public or the legal interests of individuals, the review conducted by the Federal Constitutional Court will include an examination of whether the assessment and predictions regarding impending dangers made by the legislator are based on sufficiently robust foundations. Thus, both the legislator’s assessment of the existence of such danger and the reliability of the foundations from which this assessment was or could be derived are subject to review by the Federal Constitutional Court (cf. BVerfGE 121, 317 <350>; 153, 182 <272 f. paras. 236 ff.>; 159, 223 <298 para. 170>; 161, 299 <360 para. 151> – Proof of vaccination <COVID-19>; 163, 107 <139 para. 88>).

108

However, the Constitution also leaves the legislator a certain margin with regard to both the assessment of whether a danger exists and the reliability of the foundations, which can only be reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court to a limited extent (cf. BVerfGE 104, 337 <347 f.>; 121, 317 <350>; 153, 182 <272 para. 237>; 159, 223 <298 para. 171>; 161, 299 <360 f. para. 152>; 163, 107 <139 f. para. 88>). Depending on the nature of the subject matter in question, the significance of the affected legal interests, and the legislator’s possibilities to draw sufficiently reliable conclusions, the extent of the Court’s review can range from a mere review of evident errors to a review of reasonableness or even to a substantive review that is more comprehensive in scope (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <272 para. 237> with further references; 159, 223 <298 f. para. 171> with further references; 161, 299 <360 f. para. 152>; 163, 107 <139 f. para. 88>).

109

If serious interferences with fundamental rights are at issue, it is in principle not permissible for uncertainties in the assessment of the facts to simply be interpreted to the detriment of fundamental rights holders (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <272 para. 238>; 159, 223 <299 para. 171>; 161, 299 <360 f. para. 152>). However, the state’s duty of protection, too, can be guided by pressing needs for constitutional protection. Where scientific knowledge is tentative and the legislator’s possibilities to draw sufficiently reliable conclusions are therefore limited, it is enough for the legislator to proceed on the basis of a factually accurate and tenable assessment of the available information and evidence (cf. BVerfGE 50, 290 <333 f.>; 57, 139 <160>; 65, 1 <55>; 153, 182 <272 f. para. 238>; 159, 223 <299 para. 171>; 161, 299 <360 f. para. 152>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 14 June 2023 - 2 BvL 3/20 inter alia -, para. 73; Order of the Third Chamber of the First Senate of 4 November 2024 - 1 BvR 1177/22 -, para. 26). This margin is based on the legislator’s responsibility to decide conflicts between high-ranking and highest-ranking interests despite uncertainties – a responsibility that the legislator, with its unique form of democratic legitimation, is accorded by the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 159, 223 <299 para. 171>; 161, 299 <361 para. 152>).

110

(b) According to the legislator’s objective intent, which is in line with the objectives expressed by those involved in the legislative process, § 184l of the Criminal Code serves to protect children from sexual violence (see (aa) below). The provision’s purpose is to counter two possible risks. First, the provision is intended to prevent a situation where the use of childlike sex dolls contributes to lowering inhibitions of users regarding sexual violence against children (see (bb) below). Second, the prohibitions are intended to prevent the objectification and sexualisation of children and thus also prevent the gradual normalisation of sexual acts involving children and the lowering of inhibitions to commit sexual offences generally, i.e. not just among (potential) users of such dolls (see (cc) below). Both these purposes are constitutionally legitimate and – at least in combination – generally suitable to justify the interferences with fundamental rights identified above.

111

(aa) Protecting children from sexual violence is a legitimate legislative aim. This corresponds to a duty of protection on the part of the state which arises from the Constitution and requires the legislator to protect children from sexual abuse.

112

The fundamental right to life and physical integrity under Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law not only affords individuals a subjective right against state interference with these legal interests. It also constitutes an objective decision on values enshrined in the Constitution that gives rise to duties of protection on the part of the state. This entails the state’s obligation to protect and promote the legal interests of life and physical integrity and to safeguard these interests against (unlawful) interference by others (cf. BVerfGE 39, 1 <42>; 46, 160 <164>; 56, 54 <73>; 115, 118 <152>; 121, 317 <356>; 142, 313 <337 paras. 69 f.>; 149, 293 <322 para. 74>; 157, 30 <111 para. 145>; 161, 299 <362 f. para. 155>; 172, 260 <304 para. 83> Ramstein – Deployment of drones). The state’s duty of protection arising from Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law not only takes effect in situations in which violations have already occurred. It is also oriented towards the future (cf. BVerfGE 49, 89 <140 ff.>; 53, 30 <57>; 56, 54 <78>; 121, 317 <356>; 157, 30 <111 para. 146>; 172, 260 <304 para. 83>). The protection of life and physical integrity under Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law encompasses protection against impairments and degradation of constitutionally guaranteed interests, regardless of who or what circumstances threaten to cause them (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <304 para. 83>; for environmental pollution cf. BVerfGE 49, 89 <140 ff.>; 157, 30 <112 para. 147>). In fact, the state’s duty to protect children’s physical and psychological integrity especially applies when children have no means of defence, which is typically the case for sexual violence. The duty of protection also applies to the self-determination of children, who are not just objects of protection and care but are holders of fundamental rights themselves. Children, who have their own human dignity and their own right to develop their personality (cf. BVerfGE 24, 119 <144>; 79, 51 <63>), enjoy the special protection of the state (cf. BVerfGE 57, 361 <382>). Children and adolescents have a right to the free development of their personality, but they require protection and assistance to develop into self-reliant persons in society (cf. BVerfGE 121, 69 <92 f.>; 133, 59 <73 f.>; 159, 355 <381 f. paras. 45 f.> – Federal pandemic emergency brake II <school closures>). The state thus has a special obligation to protect children’s self-determination by preventing children from becoming the means and objects of adult sexuality.

113

(bb) § 184l of the Criminal Code is intended to prevent a situation where the use of childlike sex dolls (indirectly) contributes to sexual violence against children by lowering potential perpetrators’ inhibitions to commit sexual violence against children. In this respect, the legislator considers there to be a risk that using childlike sex dolls may bring about or intensify the desire to perform the sexual acts for which the dolls are used by abusing real children (cf. para. 13).

114

The consideration underlying § 184l of the Criminal Code – that the use of childlike sex dolls could result in users committing sexual violence against children – stands up to the applicable (see (α) below) review of reasonableness (see (β) below).

115

(α) In the present case, the standard of review relating to the legislator’s risk assessment, which can range from a mere review of evident errors to a review of reasonableness or even to a substantive review that is more comprehensive in scope (cf. para. 108), requires a review of reasonableness.

116

It must be taken into account that the interferences with the general right of personality, resulting from the prohibitions laid down in § 184l(2) of the Criminal Code in particular and – insofar as manufacturing such dolls for personal use is also prohibited – in § 184l(1) first sentence no. 1 first alternative of the Criminal Code, are serious. While they do not affect the core of private life, which enjoys absolute protection (cf. para. 92), it is clear that their effect reaches deep into the private sphere because they concern the masturbatory behaviour of affected persons. In addition, § 184l of the Criminal Code sets out offences that shift the threshold of criminality forward, even far beyond the preparatory stage of an actual act of violence against children.

117

This must be balanced against the protection of the physical, psychological and sexual integrity of children, which are legal interests of paramount importance and which the state is not only authorised but also required to protect (cf. paras. 111 f.). In addition, based on the information available, the legislator had only very limited possibilities to draw sufficiently reliable conclusions. At the time the Act was adopted, no empirical research with reliable findings regarding the risk assumed by the legislator was available (cf. paras. 7 f.). Even today, there is no clear scientific evidence regarding the effects of the use of childlike sex dolls on the risk of users actually abusing children. In light of this, it was sufficient for the legislator to proceed on the basis of a context-appropriate and tenable assessment of the available information and evidence (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <273 para. 238>).

118

(β) The legislator’s risk assessment is tenable. The existing scientific studies do not yield unequivocal findings as to the effects of paedophiles or hebephiles using childlike sex dolls. The studies provide indications that the use of childlike sex dolls may increase the risk of actually abusing a child as well as indications that using them may reduce such risk.

119

Evidence from forensic and clinical practice suggests that the use of childlike sex dolls may increase the risk of abuse. In particular, Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus Beier, spokesman of the prevention network ‘Kein Täter werden’ and sexologist, has publicly expressed the view that from a clinical perspective there was concern that the use of such dolls by paedophiles could lead to a relaxation of behavioural control and adversely affect their distorted perception, which is a risk factor for committing child sexual abuse (cf. para. 4 and the statements to this effect by the coordinator of ‘Kein Täter werden’ in Ulm, para. 5).

120

In the legislative process, expert Dr. Bussweiler had stated that childlike sex dolls were increasingly being seized in the context of investigations into child sexual abuse, and it was felt that there was at least the risk of the use of childlike sex dolls reducing inhibitions of paedophiles to carry out actual child abuse (cf. para. 18). At most, these seizures of childlike sex dolls in the context of investigations for sexual offences against children establish a correlation between the use of such dolls and sexual violence against children. Nevertheless, the legislator, within its margin of assessment, was not precluded from deriving from this correlation an indication that there may be a causal link between the use of such dolls and sexual offences against children. More recent figures from the UK also suggest that this may be the case. According to the UK’s National Crime Agency, in 75% of cases where the discovery of a childlike sex doll led to a search, digital child pornography was also found in the suspect’s home ([…]).

121

Under these circumstances, it is constitutionally unobjectionable that the legislator decided to introduce prohibitions of the use of such dolls in § 184l of the Criminal Code in order to protect children. It was permissible for the legislator to base its risk assessment on the assumption that the use of childlike sex dolls may lower inhibitions to actually abuse a child, even if such an effect cannot be assumed to be automatic or even to apply to the majority of users. Therefore, the assumption of increased risk is not contradicted by the personal experience of the complainants, who believe that the use of such dolls tends to lower potential risks for them personally. Especially in view of the different personalities among users, the assumption that effects will also differ is plausible.

122

Furthermore, the legislator was not required to first obtain additional findings regarding the matter in question, or wait until such findings would be available. According to statements of scientists who work in this area, scientific and especially empirical research regarding the use of childlike sex dolls is faced with considerable methodological and practical difficulties ([…]).

123

(cc) An additional purpose of § 184l of the Criminal Code is to prevent the sexual objectification of children, including the gradual trivialisation and normalisation of sexual acts involving children. The aim of the prohibition is to prevent any (supposed) social acceptance of the sexualisation of children from materialising or spreading and thus to protect children from abuse and safeguard their dignity. This, too, is a legitimate purpose.

124

(a) Children, who have their own human dignity and their own right to develop their personality (cf. BVerfGE 24, 119 <144>; 79, 51 <63>), enjoy the special protection of the state (cf. paras. 111 f.). Human dignity is the supreme constitutive principle within the Basic Law’s system of fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE 6, 32 <36>; 41>; 45, 187 <227>; 87, 209 <228>). Human dignity entails a right to be valued and respected as a person in society (sozialer Wert- und Achtungsanspruch); this right precludes turning a person into a mere object of state action or exposing them to treatment which generally calls into question their quality as a conscious subject. Human dignity in this sense not only means the dignity of the individual, but also the dignity of human beings as a species. All persons possess human dignity, regardless of their characteristics, accomplishments or social status, even if they cannot act sensibly due to their physical or mental state. Even ‘undignified’ behaviour does not result in the forfeiture of human dignity. No one can be deprived of it. A violation of the right to be respected as a person deriving from human dignity, however, is possible (cf. BVerfGE 87, 209 <228>).

125

Therefore, an inhuman depiction of purely fictional events can also violate the imperative to respect human dignity if it includes an idea of human beings as mere objects that are at someone else’s disposal and can be (mis)treated at will. Such depiction is capable of reducing the viewer’s respect for the dignity of fellow human beings and thus also increase the risk of specific violations of this guarantee (cf. BVerfGE 87, 209 <228 f.>).

126

(b) These principles, which have been developed by the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to inhuman depictions of violence in visual form, can also be applied to physical replicas in the form of childlike sex dolls. A doll fitted with body orifices can give rise to the notion of children as mere sex objects who can be (mis)treated at will. Like the inhuman depiction of purely fictional events, the use of childlike sex dolls is capable of encouraging a gradual social normalisation of involving children in sexual contexts, thereby increasing the risk of children becoming victims of sexual violence ([…]). Preventing such a situation is a legitimate legislative objective.

127

(2) The prohibition of the sale, purchase or possession of childlike sex dolls is suitable for achieving the aforementioned purposes. The prohibition counteracts the use of such dolls, which may entail risks, and prevents the objectification of children.

128

(3) With regard to the criterion of necessity, too, the prohibitions set out in § 184l of the Criminal Code are ultimately not objectionable under constitutional law. Other possible measures that would be less intrusive for individuals like the complainants, such as a general prohibition on the sale of such dolls or a prohibition to use them that only provides for fines in case of non-compliance, are not as effective as the general prohibition on the production, sale and possession of childlike sex dolls that is subject to criminal punishment. The complainants argue that there would be simple ways of countering the risk of accidentally being confronted with childlike sex dolls, e.g. on e-commerce sites such as Amazon; they contend that one such possibility to protect minors would be a general advertising ban and a prohibition to sell to minors. These arguments, at most, only partly address the purposes of the criminal provision at issue. The criminalisation in § 184l of the Criminal Code does not aim to protect children and adolescents from their own sexuality, but from sexualisation by others who violate children’s right to respect by perceiving them as sexual objects.

129

(4) Criminalising the use of childlike sex dolls is also appropriate.

130

(a) (1) Restrictions of freedom are only appropriate if the burden imposed on the individual is in reasonable proportion to the benefits arising for the general public (cf. BVerfGE 76, 1 <51>; 153, 182 <283 para. 265>). In order to establish whether this is the case, the interests of the common good that the interference with fundamental rights serves to protect must be balanced against the effects on the legal interests of persons affected by the interference (cf. BVerfGE 92, 277 <327>; 153, 182 <283 para. 265>). The more severely individual freedom is restricted, the weightier the pursued interests of the common good must be (cf. BVerfGE 36, 47 <59>; 40, 196 <227>; 153, 182 <283 para. 265>). Conversely, the need to protect the common good becomes all the more pressing, the greater the detriment and dangers that could potentially arise if the exercise of fundamental rights were free from any restriction (cf. BVerfGE 7, 377 <404 f.>; 153, 182 <283 para. 265>). In the context of such a review based on the standard of the prohibition of excessive measures, the protection sought, which, as such, appears legitimate, may have to yield if the means chosen lead to an impairment of the rights of affected persons that is not appropriate. This is the only way to ensure that the review of whether interferences caused by state measures are appropriate can fulfil its purpose: examining whether the means used to carry out suitable and, as the case may be, necessary measures are in reasonable proportion to the protection of legal interests they serve to achieve, in consideration of the restrictions of fundamental rights they entail for affected persons (cf. BVerfGE 90, 145 <185>; 153, 182 <283 para. 265>).

131

Where the legislator’s decision involves serious interferences with fundamental rights, it is subject to a strict standard of review (cf. BVerfGE 45, 187 <238>; 153, 182 <283 para. 266>). When assessing whether a measure is appropriate, too, the legislator in principle has a margin of appreciation (cf. BVerfGE 68, 193 <219 f.>; 121, 317 <356 f.>; 152, 68 <137 para. 183> – Sanctions imposed under social law; 159, 223 <319 f. para. 217 with further references; 159, 355 <413 para. 135>; stricter with regard to the prohibition of assisted suicide services BVerfGE 153, 182 <283 f. para. 266>). In this respect, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether the legislator has taken tenable decisions within its margin of appreciation (cf. BVerfGE 159, 223 <319 para. 217>; 159, 355 <413 f. para. 135>). With regard to prognostic decisions, the legislator’s prognosis must be based on sufficiently reliable foundations (cf. BVerfGE 68, 193 <220>; 159, 223 <319 para. 217>; 159, 355 <414 para. 135>; see also BVerfGE 153, 182 <272 para. 237>).

132

For the justification of a fundamental rights interference resulting from a law, the assessment of appropriateness must also take into account whether a provision that would impair fundamental rights to a lesser degree but is also less effective could be an acceptable alternative. If the provision under review is more effective in achieving a legitimate purpose than less intrusive means, it is suitable and necessary. However, it can still be inappropriate if a less intrusive means is available that is only a little less effective than the provision under review. Wherever possible, the legislator must opt for a solution that respects freedom and mitigates particularly intrusive interferences through exemptions, transitional rules and compensation; this may also require combining the use of the chosen means with a time limit (cf. BVerfGE 163, 107 <3rd headnote, 158 para. 135>).

133

(b) Based on these standards, the challenged provision is appropriate. The severity of the interference with the affected individuals’ general right of personality and – insofar as the conduct they wish to engage in is subject to a penalty of imprisonment – their right to liberty of the person is not disproportionate to the purpose of child protection. The legislator – in considering the severity of the interference with the right to sexual self-determination – made use of its margin of appreciation in a tenable manner.

134

It is true that the prohibitions under § 184l of the Criminal Code intrude deeply into the private sphere of those affected due to their consequences in terms of masturbatory behaviour and the significant forward shift of the point in time at which criminal punishment is imposed (cf. para. 116). In particular, this applies to the direct effect of the prohibitions in § 184l(2) of the Criminal Code on potential users of childlike sex dolls and, insofar as manufacturing such dolls is also prohibited for personal use only, in § 184l(1) first sentence no. 1 first alternative of the Criminal Code. However, as the prohibitions apply to a type of behaviour which is perceptible by the outside world, the complainants’ assumption that § 184l of the Criminal Code prohibits thoughts and ideas ([…]) is not tenable. § 184l of the Criminal Code merely prevents specific kinds of masturbatory practices. There is no reliable basis for the assumption that the prohibitions deprive (potential) users of childlike sex dolls of any possibility of sexual fulfilment. Contrary to the complainants’ view ([…]), it is not ascertainable in what way the restrictions of masturbatory behaviour as such could contribute to personally stigmatising and ostracising the complainants.

135

The considerable severity of the interference must be balanced against the protection of the physical, psychological and sexual integrity of children, which are legal interests of paramount importance and which the state is not only authorised but also required to protect (cf. paras 111 f.). It is constitutionally unobjectionable for the legislator to assume that the use and distribution of childlike sex dolls increases the risk of actual child abuse and leads to objectifying children as sexual objects available to anybody at any time. On this basis, it is not ascertainable which less intrusive and less effective, but nonetheless suitable preventive means the legislator could have adopted to thwart these risks, other than prohibiting the potentially dangerous use of childlike sex dolls.

136

The complainants’ assertion that such prohibitions also deprive the complainants of the opportunity to simulate a relationship to their childlike sex dolls, which would allow them to experience feelings of proximity, does not merit a different assessment. There are no indications that childlike sex dolls in particular are necessary to meet these needs.

137

Finally, the penalties laid down in § 184l of the Criminal Code – which are moderate when compared to the overall framework of the Criminal Code – are not inappropriate. Offence and legal consequence are aligned in a manner that is not constitutionally objectionable – especially in view of the other penalties provided for in Division 13 of the Special Part of the Criminal Code (‘Offences against sexual self-determination’).

138

2. The complainants’ right to physical integrity under Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law also has not been violated. This is because any interference would be justified for the reasons laid down above with regard to the general right of personality.

139

3. There is also no violation of the prohibition of disadvantaging on the basis of disability under Art. 3(3) second sentence of the Basic Law.

140

a) A disability under constitutional law is defined as a longer-term impairment resulting from an atypical physical, intellectual or mental condition that affects a person’s ability to lead their life as an independent individual. This does not include marginal impairments, but only those of considerable significance. The cause of the disability is irrelevant in this respect. People with chronic illnesses and psychological disorders are also protected if their affliction results in a corresponding severe and long-term impairment (cf. BVerfGE 96, 288 <301>; 99, 341 <356 f.>; 151, 1 <23 f. para. 54> – Exclusion from voting rights in Bundestag elections; 160, 79 <111 f. para. 90> – Risks of disadvantaging faced by persons with disabilities in triage situations; 167, 239 <256 para. 36> – Remarks in school-leaving certificates).

141

b) Based on these standards, paedophilia or hebephilia do not constitute disabilities within the meaning of Art. 3(3) second sentence of the Basic Law and are therefore not covered by the prohibition of discrimination laid down therein. It is true that it can be assumed in favour of the complainants that their paedophilia is a sexual preference that must be classified as a disorder (cf. World Health Organization <WHO>, International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, ICD-10 F 65.4). However, their paedophilia does not impair their ability to live their lives as independent individuals.

142

Insofar as the complainants compare their situation to that of someone infected – albeit symptomless – with HIV, this is misguided. While an infection with HIV affects health in a biological and physiological sense, meaning that independent management and control of the progression of the disease is always impossible and social avoidance is primarily the result of a fear of infection (cf. Decisions of the Federal Labour Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts – BAGE 147, 60 <82 para. 74>), the perception in society of paedophiles and hebephiles depends in particular on the extent to which their sexual preferences have changed their personality in such a way that they externalise their disorder in a manner that is harmful to others ([…]).

143

4. Contrary to the complainants’ view, there is also no violation of the general guarantee of the right to equality under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law on the grounds that only the use of childlike sex dolls is punishable, but not the use of adult sex dolls.

144

a) The general guarantee of the right to equality precludes treating unequally what is essentially alike and requires that things that are essentially unequal are treated differently and in accordance with their differences. In principle, the legislator has discretion to choose the circumstances to which it attaches the same legal consequences and thus deems equal in the legal sense. However, the legislator must choose on the basis of objective reasons (cf. BVerfGE 53, 313 <329>; 90, 145 <195 f.>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 14 June 2023 - 2 BvL 3/20 inter alia -, para. 102). It cannot be determined generally and in the abstract what is tenable or extraneous when applying the general guarantee of the right to equality; rather, such determination must be made with reference to the particular subject matter affected by the law at issue (cf. BVerfGE 17, 122 <130>; 75, 108 <157>; 90, 145 <196>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 14 June 2023 - 2 BvL 3/20 inter alia -, para. 102).

145

If a group of persons addressed by a provision is treated differently from another group, although there are no differences between the groups that are of such nature or significance that they could justify the different treatment, this constitutes a violation of the general guarantee of the right to equality (cf. BVerfGE 55, 72 <88>; 84, 197 <199>; 100, 195 <205>; 107, 205 <214>; 109, 96 <123>). Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law requires that unequal treatment be based on a distinguishing criterion that is objectively justified. To justify unequal treatment, it is not sufficient that the legislator has taken into account a distinguishing criterion that is suitable by its nature. With regard to the degree of differentiation, a close connection between the identified differences and the provision that differentiates between them must exist that can serve as an objectively tenable distinguishing criterion of sufficient weight (cf. BVerfGE 81, 208 <224>; 88, 87 <97>; 93, 386 <401>).

146

b) Based thereon, there are objective reasons for the unequal treatment of users of childlike sex dolls on the one hand and users of adult sex dolls on the other which justify their different treatment under criminal law.

147

§ 184l of the Criminal Code is based on the consideration that sexual contact of adults with children violates children’s sexual self-determination and integrity and is therefore in and of itself not permitted by the legal order. From the outset, children, unlike adults, cannot give valid consent to sexual acts with adults like those replicated with sex dolls. Therefore, from the outset, childlike sex dolls cannot be used to replicate sexual acts between two adults based on the valid consent of all those involved; in this regard, they differ from adult sex dolls.

148

5. Finally, § 184l of the Criminal Code also does not violate the constitutional requirement of specificity under Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law.

149

a) Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law guarantees that an act can be punished only if it was defined by law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. Its meaning extends beyond merely prohibiting punishments based on customary or retroactive laws. Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law encompasses a strict requirement of specificity for legislation as well as a corresponding prohibition – aimed at the courts – on imposing punishment for offences not provided for in the law based on analogies to existing ones (cf. BVerfGE 160, 284 <317 para. 88>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 9 April 2025 - 2 BvR 1974/22 -, para. 24).

150

On the one hand, these guarantees serve to ensure that the legislator itself decides in abstract terms what constitutes punishable conduct. In this respect, Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law contains a strict requirement that interferences with fundamental rights be based on a statutory provision, which prevents the executive and the judiciary from determining the legal prerequisites for punishment. In deciding what constitutes criminal conduct, the legislator assumes responsibility for a form of state action that is among the most intrusive interferences with individual freedom. The extent to which a political community uses criminal law as a means of social control, and the areas in which it does so, are fundamental decisions that may only be taken by the legislator (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <194>; 143, 38 <53 para. 36>; 153, 310 <339 f. para. 72> – Cartilage in meat; 160, 284 <317 para. 89>). On the other hand, these guarantees serve to protect persons addressed by a provision as required under the rule of law. Everyone should be able to foresee what conduct is prohibited and punishable. Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law thus serves to safeguard freedom (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <194 f.>; 143, 38 <53 para. 37>; 153, 310 <340 para. 73>; 160, 284 <317 para. 89>).

151

In its function as a requirement of specificity, Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law includes the obligation for the legislator to determine, via the democratic parliamentary decision-making process, essential questions on whether specific conduct should be punishable or exempt from punishment, and to define the elements of a criminal offence with sufficient specificity so that the extent and scope of criminal offences can be recognised and can be determined by interpretation (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <195>; 160, 284 <317 f. para. 90>).

152

The general rule-of-law principles which require that all essential decisions affecting the exercise of fundamental rights be taken by the legislator (cf. BVerfGE 101, 1 <34>; 126, 170 <195>; 150, 1 <96 ff. paras. 190 ff.>), and that legislation be drafted as precisely as possible given the particular nature of the underlying subject matter and the purposes pursued (cf. BVerfGE 93, 213 <238>; 126, 170 <195>), apply with particular stringency to the area of substantive criminal law with its potentially acute impact on fundamental rights. The requirement of specificity therefore means that the wording of criminal legislation must be formulated in such a way that persons addressed by a provision can generally foresee from the text whether specific conduct is punishable or not (cf. BVerfGE 92, 1 <12>; 126, 170 <195>; 153, 310 <340 para. 74>; 160, 284 <318 para. 91>).

153

However, in the field of criminal law, too, the legislator must remain capable of addressing the diversity of situations that occur in everyday life. If the legislator had to describe every criminal offence down to the last detail instead of making the essential determinations regarding the constituent elements of the offence and the form and degree of punishment, there is a danger that the laws would become too rigid or too concerned with the minutiae of specific examples and would no longer be capable of dealing with changes in the overall situation or with the unique features of each new case (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <195>; 143, 38 <54 f. para. 40>; 153, 310 <341 para. 76>; 160, 284 <318 para. 92>).

154

Due to the necessity of keeping criminal law provisions general and abstract in nature, it is unavoidable that in borderline cases it may be doubtful whether specific conduct already or still falls within the ambit of the statutory offence. The requirement of specificity does not mean that the legislator is required to define all offences solely through descriptive constituent elements whose meaning is immediately obvious to everyone. This requirement does not rule out the use of indeterminate concepts that must be given specific shape, including blanket clauses, in criminal law from the outset (cf. BVerfGE 92, 1 <12>; 126, 170 <196>; 143, 38 <55 para. 41>; 153, 310 <341 para. 77>; 160, 284 <318 f. para. 93>).

155

It cannot be generally established which degree of specificity individual offences must have (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <196>; 143, 38 <55 para. 41>; 153, 310 <341 f. para. 77>; 160, 284 <319 para. 94>). Therefore, it must be determined in an overall assessment taking into account possible alternatives whether the legislator satisfied the requirements arising from Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law in the individual case. The assessment must include the particularities of the offence in question, including the circumstances that led to the provision being introduced in the first place (cf. BVerfGE 28, 175 <183>). The more severe the threat of punishment, the more precisely the legislator must determine and define the elements of the offence (cf. BVerfGE 75, 329 <342>; 126, 170 <196>; 153, 310 <341 para. 75>; 160, 284 <319 para. 94>). The group of persons addressed by the provision can also be relevant (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <196>; 153, 310 <342 para. 77, 352 para. 97>; 160, 284 <319 para. 94>).

156

According to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court, it may be sufficient in borderline cases that the risk of punishment is merely recognisable. This takes into account the inevitability of some degree of ambiguity (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <196>). There are no objections to the use of indeterminate legal concepts that require specification or of blanket clauses if there is a reliable basis for interpreting and applying the provision in question by using accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reading the provision in question together with other provisions in the same law, through consideration of the statutory context or by drawing on the established case-law of the highest courts (cf. BVerfGE 126, 170 <196 f.>; 143, 38 <55 para. 41>; 153, 310 <341 para. 77>; 160, 284 <319 para. 95>). The mere fact that the law, if it is interpreted expansively, would also cover cases that the parliamentary legislator did not intend to be punishable does not render the law unconstitutional if and to the extent that a restrictive and more precise interpretation is possible (cf. BVerfGE 87, 399 <411>; 126, 170 <196 f.>; 160, 284 <320 para. 95>).

157

b) Based on these standards, § 184l of the Criminal Code is compatible with the requirement of specificity under Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law. Especially with regard to the precondition that the replica must represent a child or a child’s body part (cf. BTDrucks 19/23707, p. 42), the concerns expressed by the complainants regarding the specificity of the constituent element of the ‘childlikeness’ of a sex doll cannot be shared by the Court.

158

The constituent element must be assessed on the basis of the statutory definition in § 176(1) no. 1 and § 184b(1) no. 1a of the Criminal Code, according to which a child is a person under the age of 14 ([…]). The standard in this respect is that the replica is unambiguously ‘childlike’ from the perspective of an objective observer (cf. accordingly regarding § 184c Criminal Code and persons who appear to be adolescents but are not, Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Chamber of the Second Senate of 6 December 2008 - 2 BvR 2369/08 -, para. 5 with further references; regarding § 184(4) Criminal Code (former version) cf. also Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in Criminal Matters, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen – BGHSt 47, 55 <62>); this conclusion must be drawn from an overall assessment of the potential object of the crime. In this regard, it is not only the size of the replica that is significant; other aspects – such as the voice of a speaking sex robot or the replication of immature primary and secondary sex characteristics that are not fully developed – must also be included in the assessment ([…]). ‘Mixed forms’ of sex dolls that are child-sized, but have, for example, female secondary sex characteristics that are fully developed, do not fall under the ‘physical replica of a child’ element that is a precondition of the offence ([…]). Conversely, deviation from the natural size of a child can be compensated by other features – for example childlike proportions of the sex characteristics or childlike facial features ([…]). A restrictive interpretation is possible, whereby at least two criteria for being ‘childlike’ within the meaning of § 184l of the Criminal Code must be present; one of these criteria can be size, but this must be further supported by other unambiguous criteria. The overall assessment to be conducted gives sufficient consideration to the ambiguity of the element of being ‘childlike’, which is inevitable in light of the variety of childlike sex dolls and technical developments. Therefore, contrary to the complainants’ view, it is also not necessary under the requirement of specificity for the legislator to define unambiguous physical criteria through which a sex doll can unequivocally be identified as a replica of a person under the age of 14.

159

With regard to a child’s body parts, too, there is a reliable basis for interpreting and applying the provision. It is not true that it is no longer possible to determine whether a replica is childlike if only one body part is replicated, as asserted by the complainants. With regard to the definition of the term ‘body part’, the interpretation of other provisions in the Criminal Code – such as § 226(1) no. 2 (‘body part’) or § 184k(1) no. 1 (genitals, buttocks, female breast) – can be referenced ([…]). It stands to reason that in the overall assessment of replicas of body parts, size is less important than other factors. That said, whilst the reduction to one body part may mean that some typically childlike features may be lacking in a specific replica, the prerequisites for identifying an unambiguous replication of childlike features remain unaffected ([…]). Thus, the complainants’ objection that missing pubic hair or small breasts can be signs of a replica being childlike but also occur in adults has no basis either. If a replica cannot be found to be unambiguously childlike in such cases for lack of further indicators, such a replica does not come under the constituent element of § 184l of the Criminal Code when the provision is interpreted narrowly, as is required here.

C.

160

The decision was taken with 6:2 votes.