Order of 22 July 2026

R e a s o n s :

A. 

1

The constitutional complaint concerns visa applications by Afghan nationals in the context of the humanitarian admission programme ‘Human Rights List’ (Menschenrechtsliste), which has since been terminated.

I. 

2

The complainants are Afghan nationals. In Afghanistan, complainant no. 1 lived in women’s shelters with her minor sons, complainant no. 2 and complainant no. 3. They are currently in Peshawar (Pakistan), where they receive support from the federally owned German Agency for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH – GIZ), upon commission of the Federal Government.

3

1. a) On 14 September 2021, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (hereinafter: Federal Ministry of the Interior) declared to the Federal Foreign Office that it should admit the complainants to Germany as part of the Human Rights List programme in accordance with § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz – AufenthG). The Human Rights List programme was intended to provide a possibility of admission to Germany for those individuals who had put themselves at risk through activities promoting freedom of expression, democracy, human rights and especially women’s rights, cultural identity or academic freedom, freedom of the arts or of the press, and had worked together with German ministries, authorities or organisations or had furthered German interests or whose work had been supported by German funding, and who were thus in danger once the Taliban seized power. This group differs from the one addressed by the ‘Locally Employed Civilians’ programme (Ortskräfteverfahren), which concerns individuals who were directly employed by a federal ministry or indirectly worked for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Federal Foreign Office.

4

Complainant no. 1 was notified of the declaration of admission on 14 September 2021. On 1 February 2022, she provided information to a contractor commissioned by the Federal Foreign Office (‘VA Office’; cf. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/2480918-2480918, retrieval date: 16 July 2026) regarding herself and her children. In an email dated 5 April 2022, the contractor acknowledged receipt of the information provided and asked her to give her phone number, which complainant no. 1 provided in an email on 20 April 2022. On 6 December 2022, the contractor requested that complainant no. 1 keep the contractor updated on the status of the complainants’ passports. On 26 December 2022, the contractor asked her where she was staying. Complainant no. 1 replied on 28 February 2023 that she was staying in Kabul (Afghanistan) with her sons and had not yet received passports because the passport authority had been closed, but that it would reopen on 1 March 2023. In an email dated 6 September 2023, an office of GIZ (MRL Afghanistan) advised complainant no. 1 that she and complainants nos. 2 and 3 had received a declaration of admission from the Federal Ministry of the Interior some time ago and were therefore entitled to apply for German visas. Complainant no. 1 was asked to state whether she and her sons were still interested in leaving for Germany.

5

On 7 September 2023, complainant no. 1 replied by email that she and her sons were still in Kabul and wanted to leave for Germany, but had still not received passports. Her minor sons needed their father’s consent to apply for passports, but he had died. By email of 8 September 2023, GIZ (MRL Afghanistan) requested a copy of the ID card of one of the sons in order to correct his date of birth. On 14 November 2023, GIZ (MRL Afghanistan) advised complainant no. 1 that she could only apply for visas through Pakistan. She was advised to apply for visas for Pakistan and inform GIZ of the file reference. On 7 February 2024, complainant no. 1 informed GIZ that the complainants had now received passports. GIZ (MRL Afghanistan) replied that she should now contact their colleagues in Pakistan (AFG-Pak Taskforce). On 7 October 2024, complainant no. 1 emailed this GIZ unit (AFG-Pak Taskforce) and asked for support for travelling from Kabul to Islamabad. GIZ (AFG-Pak Taskforce) replied by email on the same day. It advised complainant no. 1 to ‘kindly note that admissions to Germany are granted on a preliminary basis and do not guarantee a successful visa application for Germany’.

6

On 26 October 2024, the complainants travelled to Islamabad (Pakistan), where they filed their visa applications at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany on 29 October 2024.

7

b) Following the election to the 21st German Bundestag on 23 February 2025, a new Federal Government was formed that was supported by the parliamentary groups CDU/CSU and SPD. In the coalition agreement of 5 May 2025, the ruling parties agreed to end all voluntary admission programmes, e.g. in respect of Afghanistan, to the greatest extent possible. The issuing of visas in the context of admission programmes concerning Afghanistan was suspended.

8

On 27 October 2025, complainant no. 1 was interviewed at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Islamabad to further determine the facts of her case.

9

By order of 4 December 2025 - 2 BvR 1511/25 - the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court enjoined the Federal Republic of Germany to decide, without delay, on the visa applications of an Afghan judge and his family who had been granted declarations of admission under § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act.

10

On 8 December 2025, the Federal Ministry of the Interior declared to the Federal Foreign Office that the declarations of admission under the ‘Stopgap’ programme (Überbrückungsprogramm) and the Human Rights List programme, which concerned approximately 640 individuals ([…]), were ‘invalid and expired’. By notices of 10 December 2025, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Islamabad rejected the complainants’ visa applications with reference to this declaration of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It stated that the statutory prerequisite for issuing visas on the basis of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act no longer existed.

11

2. The complainants filed an action with the Berlin Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) against the notices rejecting their applications on 23 December 2025, requesting that the Federal Republic of Germany be enjoined to issue visas to them or, subsidiarily, to enjoin the Federal Republic of Germany to make a new decision on their visa applications. They also applied for interim legal protection. In addition to the issuance of the visas, the complainants sought to enjoin the respondent to continue to provide shelter and support until the final conclusion of the proceedings or until their entry into Germany respectively and to take effective measures to protect them from deportation by the Pakistani authorities.

12

3. By order of 29 December 2025, the Administrative Court rejected the applications for interim protection. It found that the complainants had not demonstrated a credible claim for an interim protection order. In particular, such a claim could not be based on § 6(3) first and second sentence and § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act. The court held that the necessary declarations of admission no longer existed, since the Federal Ministry of the Interior had declared them invalid and expired. The court went on to state that this decision to withdraw the declaration of admission originally issued in favour of the complainants withstood legal scrutiny. In taking this decision, the Federal Ministry of the Interior was not required to conduct a formal procedure – for example in accordance with §§ 48 and 49 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz – VwVfG) – and constitutional law did not preclude the withdrawal of the declaration of admission. According to the court, the decision also withstood a review for arbitrariness, which was the standard to be applied in this case, because it did not appear untenable; this would be the case, for example, if the decision had been based on criteria such as skin colour or religion. The further applications were also unsuccessful. The application to protect the complainants from deportation by the Pakistani authorities was found to be inadmissible because it was not sufficiently specific. The application regarding the provision of shelter, food and medical care was unfounded. It was not ascertainable that there was a basis in ordinary law for the assistance sought. According to the court, the previous practice did not give rise to a legally enforceable expectation of continued assistance following the revocation of the declaration of admission.

13

4. The Berlin-Brandenburg Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) rejected the complaint against that decision by order of 16 January 2026, which is challenged in the present proceedings. It held that the declaration of admission pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act did not constitute an administrative act. § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act did not grant individuals a right under public law to be issued visas. According to the Higher Administrative Court, the provision did not serve to protect and give effect to the fundamental rights of individual foreign nationals but instead reflected the Federation’s autonomous exercise of its leeway in foreign policy matters; as a matter of the Federal Government, the decision was as such not subject to judicial review. The declaration of admission was therefore only internal in nature. The Higher Administrative Court also found no grounds for a judicial review of the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s change of opinion based on the prohibition of arbitrariness. There were no grounds for examining whether the declaration of admission was free from arbitrariness, because it was individual in nature, the respondent’s considerations merited protection and their disclosure was therefore incompatible with the legislative purpose. The court held that this need for protection was not altered by the fact that the political considerations underlying the decision had changed. If a review of arbitrariness were conducted, the respondent, contrary to the legislative purpose, would have to disclose the reasons for the original willingness to admit the affected individuals in order to explain the subsequent change of opinion. The case did not provide grounds for further-reaching considerations based on the standard that the Administrative Court relied on. The complaint failed to sufficiently substantiate even the underlying facts for the expectation, which the complainants claimed was protected, that the Federal Republic of Germany continued to be willing to admit them. According to the court, the complaint also did not plausibly challenge the assumption made by the court of first instance that political interests could change, for example following a change of government, and it therefore had to be possible to revoke a declaration of admission in order to ensure that the administration had decision-making leeway, without affecting the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. There was no need to decide on the other applications made in the complaint regarding shelter, provisions and protection against deportation.

14

5. The Higher Administrative Court rejected the complaint seeking remedy for a violation of the right to be heard (Anhörungsrüge), lodged on 2 February 2026, in its order of 27 February 2026.

15

6. The Higher Administrative Court rejected the application, filed by brief dated 16 February 2026, pursuant to § 80(7) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung – VwGO) to amend the order of 29 December 2025 in an order of 2 March 2026. […]

II. 

16

On 19 February 2026, the complainants lodged a constitutional complaint and applied for a preliminary injunction. They assert a violation of an extraterritorial duty of protection on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany following from Art. 2(2) first sentence and Art. 3(2) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 1(2) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG), a violation of the requirement of the protection of legitimate expectations under Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law and/or Art. 2(2) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law, of their right to effective legal protection under Art. 19(4) first sentence of the Basic Law, of their right to equal treatment under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law and their right to be heard under Art. 103(1) of the Basic Law.

17-19

[…]

III. 

20

The Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of the Land Berlin for Justice and Consumer Protection (Senatsverwaltung für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz des Landes Berlin) were given the opportunity to submit statements.

21-27

[…]

28

The Federal Constitutional Court had access to the files of the initial proceedings (file references OVG 6 S 13/26 and OVG 6 M 9/26).

B. 

29

The constitutional complaint is well-founded. The order of the Higher Administrative Court of 16 January 2026 violates the complainants’ right under Art. 3(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law.

30

It must be noted that the interpretation of ordinary law and its application in specific cases is solely a matter for the competent courts. The Federal Constitutional Court can only intervene if a violation of constitutional law is at issue. The fact that a decision objectively misapplied ordinary law is not sufficient for finding a violation of constitutional law. Rather, the courts’ error must be in disregard of fundamental rights. The structuring of court proceedings, the determination and evaluation of the underlying facts, the interpretation of the law and its application to the specific case are exempt from review by the Federal Constitutional Court so long as there are no indications that they contain errors based on a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the significance and scope of a fundamental right, in particular of the extent or its scope of protection, which have a material impact on the examined case or which give rise to a violation of Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law in its manifestation as a prohibition of arbitrariness (cf. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE 18, 85 <92 f.>; 30, 173 <196 f.>; 57, 250 <272>; 74, 102 <127>; 85, 248 <257 f.>; 109, 38 <58 f.>; 110, 226 <270>).

31

Based on these standards, the Higher Administrative Court was in principle correct in examining whether § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act gives rise to a claim on the part of the complainants to be issued visas to enter the Federal Republic of Germany, given that state authority is bound by fundamental rights, due to an extraterritorial duty of protection under constitutional law. In this respect, the court found that no such claim arises from Art. 2(2) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 1(2) of the Basic Law; this decision did not amount to a specific violation of constitutional law (see I. below). The challenged decision is also in line with the requirement to protect legitimate expectations under the rule of law (Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law) to the extent that it denied a claim on the part of the complainants to be issued the requested visas (see II. below). Such a claim also does not follow from the general principle of equal treatment under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law (see III. below). However, the Higher Administrative Court failed to recognise the scope of the prohibition of arbitrariness under the rule of law, which follows from Art. 3(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law. The Federal Ministry of the Interior’s declaration of revocation of 8 December 2025 does not satisfy the requirements of the prohibition of arbitrariness (see IV. below). There is no need to decide whether the decision of the Higher Administrative Court additionally violates the complainants’ right to be heard under Art. 103(1) of the Basic Law or their right to effective legal protection under Art. 19(4) first sentence of the Basic Law (see V. below). As the case is referred back to the Higher Administrative Court, it will have to decide whether the Federal Republic of Germany has an obligation to temporarily continue to support the complainants in Pakistan (see VI. below).

I. 

32

The Higher Administrative Court did not fail to recognise the scope of extraterritorial duties of protection arising from Art. 2(2) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 1(2) of the Basic Law. This fundamental right does not give rise to a duty of protection under which the Federal Republic of Germany would be obligated to protect the complainants from deportation to Afghanistan by the Pakistani authorities, and from a violation of the principle of non-refoulement under international law that such deportation might entail, by granting them visas to enter Germany.

33

1. As the complainants are Afghan nationals who are currently in Pakistan, this is an extraterritorial situation, in which the fundamental rights of the Basic Law do not automatically apply.

34

a) Every state is entitled to restrict free entry to its territory and to determine the criteria entitling foreign nationals to enter its territory (cf. BVerfGE 94, 166 <198 f.>). The Basic Law neither precludes liberal admission of foreign nationals from non-European countries, nor does it require such admission (cf. BVerfGE 76, 1 <47>). The fundamental right to asylum under Art. 16a of the Basic Law does not give rise to a right of foreign nationals to enter the country from abroad (cf. BVerfGE 94, 166 <199>). Nor does the right to free movement under Art. 11 of the Basic Law establish a right for foreign nationals to enter the country; this fundamental right is only afforded to German nationals. A foreign national seeking to enter the country also cannot derive a right to enter and stay in Germany from Art. 2(1) of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 76, 1 <71>; 80, 81 <96>). Likewise, Art. 6(1) of the Basic Law does not give rise to a right to enter and stay in Germany; this right only concerns the state’s obligation to take into account the great significance accorded to the protection of marriage and family life in decisions affecting residence law (cf. BVerfGE 76, 1 <46 f., 49 ff.>).

35

b) The fundamental right to life and physical integrity under Art. 2(2) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 1(2) of the Basic Law and the Basic Law’s principle of openness to international law entail a general mandate of protection with regard to international humanitarian law and the applicable human rights (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <304 paras. 82 ff.> – Ramstein – Deployment of drones; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Chamber of the Second Senate of 3 February 2026 - 2 BvR 1626/25 -, para. 78). Under certain circumstances, this general mandate of protection may give rise to a specific duty of protection, in the sense of an obligation to work towards ensuring that a foreign state complies with provisions of international humanitarian law that serve the protection of life and with the applicable human rights (cf. BVerfGE 142, 313 <338 para. 71>; 158, 170 <186 paras. 34 f.> – IT security vulnerabilities; 172, 260 <304 paras. 84 ff.>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Chamber of the Second Senate of 3 February 2026 - 2 BvR 1626/25 -, para. 78). This duty of protection, with the aim of compliance with the rules of international law regarding the protection of life, also encompasses dangers that originate from actors not bound by the fundamental rights of the Basic Law. In general, this also includes dangers posed by foreign states (cf. BVerfGE 112, 1 <26 f.>; 172, 260 <309 f. para. 92>). The duties of protection arising from the fundamental rights of the Basic Law are not limited to German nationals or individuals within the territory of Germany. Non-German nationals resident in foreign countries may also be protected from dangers if such dangers have a sufficient link to the sovereign powers of the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <310 para. 94>).

36

That said, when the danger to life or physical integrity originates from the actions of a foreign state, the general mandate to protect gives rise to a specific duty of protection only in cases in which there is a serious risk that international humanitarian law and/or international human rights, in particular the right to life, are systematically violated by the actions of the foreign state. Moreover, there must be a sufficient link to the sovereign powers of the Federal Republic of Germany which establishes the necessary nexus of responsibility (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <312 para. 98>).

37

Whether a sufficient link to German sovereign powers exists must be determined by way of an overall assessment in the individual case, in the context of which the severity of the violation of international law in question may also be taken into consideration (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <312 paras. 98 and 314 f. paras. 101 f.>). If effects emanating from German territory create or contribute to a situation of danger in a foreign state, this can establish such a sufficient link. A specific contribution with regard to the actions of a foreign state that give rise to the danger is needed to establish a sufficient link to German state authority that is bound by the fundamental rights; such contributions must be of some significance and go beyond mere factual causation (cf. BVerfGE 172, 260 <314 f. para. 102>).

38

2. Based on these standards, the Federal Republic of Germany does not have a duty of protection vis-à-vis the complainants with regard to the potential dangers they may face. The required overall assessment does not establish a sufficient link of the dangers to the Federal Republic of Germany.

39

a) The Federal Republic of Germany is barred from deporting people to a country in which they face torture and death, or from participating in such deportations. The principle of non-refoulement under international law prohibits the return, deportation or extradition of individuals to countries where they may face torture, inhuman treatment or persecution. It is enshrined in Art. 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (Geneva Convention) and in Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (cf. BVerfGE 94, 49 <92>; ECtHR, M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 11 December 2018, 59793/17, § 105 ff.). The Federal Republic of Germany is also prohibited from deporting a person if the receiving state does not offer sufficient guarantees to prevent the person concerned from being deported in violation of the principle of non-refoulement (cf. ECtHR <GC>, Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, 23 February 2012, 27765/09, § 146 f.). However, the principle of non-refoulement only applies if the Federal Republic of Germany exerts effective control over the persons concerned; for the complainants in the present case, who are in Pakistani territory, this is not the case (cf. ECtHR <GC>, M.N. and Others v. Belgium, 5 March 2020, 3599/18, § 102 ff.; ECtHR, S.S. and Others v. Italy, 20 May 2025, 21660/18, § 99 ff., see paras. 40 f.).

40

b) The threat (of deportation) faced by the complainants is not directly caused by the Federal Republic of Germany, but by the state of Pakistan. German state authorities did not contribute to this threat in a way that would establish a sufficient link to German state authority. It is true that the complainants’ entry into Pakistan to apply for visas at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Islamabad and their continued presence in Pakistan occurred after complainant no. 1 communicated by email with the VA Office and GIZ (MRL Afghanistan and AFG-Pak Taskforce) regarding the declaration of admission mentioned in this communication. However, their entry and presence in Pakistan were based on the complainants’ own decision.

41

The Federal Republic of Germany’s support of the complainants – which continues to this day – was intended to facilitate the visa procedures and provide subsequent legal protection to clarify the right to a visa. It neither created nor increased any danger to the complainants; on the contrary, it aimed to prevent such dangers. At no time could the Federal Republic of Germany fully guarantee the complainants’ safety in Pakistani territory, nor did it give them any assurance to this effect. While the visa procedures were ongoing, Pakistani authorities repeatedly deported Afghan nationals without visas for Pakistan, including those housed by GIZ, and the Federal Republic of Germany was unable to prevent these deportations.

42

c) No different assessment is merited by Art. 3(2) second sentence of the Basic Law, including in regard to the threat of gender-based violence faced by complainant no. 1 as a woman in Afghanistan. The guarantees arising from this provision do not establish a sufficient link to the state authority of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is necessary to engage the duty of protection set out above, nor do they render this link unnecessary.

43

3. Finally, contrary to the complainants’ view, the Federal Republic of Germany is not responsible under (constitutional) law for the complainants in the sense of a comprehensive 'guarantor of protection'.

44

The complainants contend that the Federal Republic of Germany is required, beyond the standards developed in the decision Ramstein – Deployment of drones (BVerfGE 172, 260), to continue to support them and to issue visas, although no specific contribution to the threat of deportation faced by the complainants can be attributed to German state authority. The complainants argue that the Federal Republic of Germany is under a legal obligation to avert dangers emanating from other states (Pakistan, Afghanistan) due to its ‘de facto assumption of protection’, in which they had placed their trust. They claim that, similar to a ‘guarantor of protection’, the Federal Republic of Germany is responsible within the meaning of § 13 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB), and its failure to act is subject to criminal liability on the basis of a legal duty to act, because it must guarantee the complainants’ protection, as it has de facto assumed their protection and they have not made use of other protection or rescue options due to their reliance on this protection.

45

In essence, the complainants raise the question of whether their expectations regarding future actions of the Federal Republic of Germany are protected under (constitutional) law. However, the question of whether the complainants could legitimately expect a favourable outcome of the visa procedures in light of the specific circumstances of these procedures and the support provided by the Federal Republic of Germany in Pakistan is not a matter of duties of protection arising from fundamental rights, but must be assessed on the basis of the requirement to protect legitimate expectations under the rule of law only (cf. in this regard II. below).

II. 

46

In rejecting the complainants’ claim to be issued visas, the Higher Administrative Court did not fail to recognise the requirements arising from the protection of legitimate expectations under the rule of law; it interpreted and applied the relevant legal provisions in a way that was not arbitrary.

47

1. The principle of the rule of law enshrined in Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law, in conjunction with the fundamental rights, protects the trust in the reliability and predictability of the legal system created under the Basic Law, and of the rights acquired on the basis of that system (cf. BVerfGE 132, 302 <317 para. 41>; 133, 143 <158 para. 41>; 159, 183 <208 para. 61> – Limitation of tax assessment period for development charges). The protection of legitimate expectations does not require that every legal position that has been acquired must be upheld. However, it warrants a case-by-case assessment, based on the criteria of proportionality and reasonableness, of whether priority must be given to the interests of the common good or to the interest of the individual in the continuation of a legal situation to which they have become accustomed and on which they have relied (cf. BVerfGE 59, 128 <166>; 116, 24 <52 ff.>).

48

2. The Higher Administrative Court did not fail to recognise these requirements. It was not required to assume that a ‘de facto assumption of protection’ in Pakistan created a constitutionally relevant legitimate expectation for the complainants that visas for entry into the Federal Republic of Germany would be issued (see a) below). It is also not objectionable under constitutional law that the Higher Administrative Court did not find that the declaration of admission issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 14 September 2021 established a subjective legal position on the part of the complainants that could be the basis for a constitutionally protected legitimate expectation that visas would be issued (see b) below). Nor did the Higher Administrative Court have to infer such a basis for legitimate expectations from the communications maintained by complainant no. 1 with the VA Office and GIZ (MRL Afghanistan and AFG-Pak Taskforce) between 2021 and 2024 (see c) below).

49

a) The Higher Administrative Court was not required to assume that a ‘de facto assumption of protection’ in Pakistan created a constitutionally relevant legitimate expectation for the complainants that visas for entry into the Federal Republic of Germany would be issued.

50

Even if it is assumed that a merely de facto administrative action may lead to a minimum degree of binding obligation and thus to a self-imposed obligation on the part of the state ([…]), the requirement to protect legitimate expectations may in any case not be used as a ‘substitute mechanism’ to bring about a legal obligation contrary to the provisions of foreign national law ([…]). De facto administrative action cannot give rise to a claim for the adoption of an administrative act (here: the granting of a visa) if this would circumvent statutory prerequisites and formal requirements – such as the requirement that an assurance is made in writing (cf. § 38 Administrative Procedure Act).

51

Notwithstanding the above, the support provided to the complainants by the Federal Republic of Germany – in particular, assistance with their departure for Pakistan, their accommodation, food and medical care –, even when viewed as a whole, does not provide any basis for a constitutionally protected expectation that visas will be granted. The support provided to the complainants in Pakistan merely served to ensure that the visa procedures could be conducted; their outcome was open. This was also clearly evident to the complainants. This applies with regard to the fact that, by the time complainant no. 1 left for Pakistan, some time had passed since she had been notified of the declaration of admission of 14 September 2021 – which may have come through the organisation ‘Women for Afghan Women’ (see para. 65 below). The complainants were in Kabul until October 2024. On 7 October 2024, before they left for Pakistan (26 October 2024), they received an email from GIZ (AFG-Pak Taskforce) pointing out that the declaration of admission was non-binding (‘Kindly note that admissions to Germany are granted on a preliminary basis and do not guarantee a successful visa application for Germany’). At the time the complainants applied for visas with the German Embassy in Pakistan in October 2024, not all prerequisites for granting the visas had been met according to the embassy’s assessment; this is shown in particular by the subsequent interview with complainant no. 1 on 27 October 2025 to further determine the facts of the case.

52

b) The Higher Administrative Court did not violate constitutional law by finding that the declaration of admission issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 14 September 2021 did not establish a subjective legal position on the part of the complainants that could serve as a basis for constitutionally protected expectations that visas would be issued. It interpreted and applied the underlying legal provisions in a manner that was not arbitrary.

53

aa) The Higher Administrative Court assumes that the declaration of admission issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 14 September 2021 was not directed at establishing a subjective legal position of the beneficiaries. According to the court, in revoking the declaration of admission on 8 December 2025, the Federal Ministry of the Interior was not bound by the prerequisites set out in §§ 48 and 49 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

54

This understanding of the declaration of admission is based on § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, which, pursuant to § 6(3) second sentence of the Residence Act, applies in regard to the granting of visas. Pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, a visa is to be granted if the Federal Ministry of the Interior or the body designated by it has declared that the foreign national is to be admitted ‘so as to uphold the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany’. This interpretation and the determination and appraisal of the facts of the case do not indicate any error which might be based on a generally incorrect view of the significance and scope of the constitutional protection of legitimate expectations.

55

The Higher Administrative Court construes the declaration of admission, in accordance with the wording of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, as meaning that the decision on admission is a political decision that serves to uphold the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. Likewise, according to the legislative purpose that is reflected in the legislative materials, the provision is to be applied in individual cases and ‘the decision on admission is an expression of the autonomous exercise of sovereign powers’, which is why the provision is not intended to provide foreign nationals with a claim to a declaration of admission. The primary aim of the provision is to retain leeway in terms of foreign policy (cf. the Federal Government’s Draft Immigration Act of 7 February 2003, Bundestag document, Bundestagsdrucksache – BTDrucks 15/420, p. 77 <regarding § 22 Residence Act>).

56

§ 22 second sentence of the Residence Act provides that a temporary residence permit is to be granted when the Federal Ministry of the Interior ‘has declared, so as to uphold the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, that the foreigner is to be admitted’. The provision thereby gives the Federal Government the opportunity to admit foreign nationals from abroad in individual cases based on a political decision. The provision is thus part of a number of provisions in which the legislator has granted leeway to the executive – which extends beyond the options for entry and residence provided in the Residence Act for the protection of individual rights – for political decisions regarding the entry and residence of foreign nationals to uphold the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (cf., e.g., § 23a(1) first and fourth sentence Residence Act <hardship commission>; § 60a(1) first sentence Residence Act <general suspension of deportation for specific states or categories of foreign nationals>).

57

The prevailing view in the case-law and legal scholarship assumes that § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act – at least prior to entry – does not grant beneficiaries under this provision an individual right to a declaration of admission that serves to protect the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. Bremen Higher Administrative Court, Order of 13 February 2018 - 1 B 268/17 -, […] para. 13; Lower-Saxony Higher Administrative Court, Order of 14 June 2018 - 13 ME 208/18 -, […] para. 13; […]).

58

The view of the Higher Administrative Court that a declaration of admission does not establish a protected legal position for beneficiaries is not at odds with the assumption that a foreign national is entitled – provided that the other prerequisites for issuing a visa are met – to the issuance of a visa in accordance with § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act if a declaration of admission was made ([…]). This is because such a claim requires that the declaration of admission is (still) valid at the time the decision on whether to grant the visa is made. The Constitution does not require that the point in time for the decision on the visa be shifted to an earlier stage – namely, to when the original declaration of admission was made.

59

Since the declaration of admission, based on the constitutionally permissible interpretation of the Higher Administrative Court, does not in itself establish a subjective legal position of the complainants, it is not a sufficient basis for a constitutionally protected expectation that visas will be granted. In this regard, a declaration of admission pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act differs from the granting of a pardon – which the complainants contend is a comparable mechanism. Pardons change the legal effects of criminal sentences and grant freedom to those pardoned. Any impairment of the legal position granted would affect individual rights which the affected persons should be able to expect, in principle, to continue to apply (cf. BVerfGE 30, 108 <110 f.>; Chamber Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Kammerentscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGK 20, 260 <266>).

60

bb) The Higher Administrative Court did not find the declaration of admission issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 14 September 2021 to be an administrative act, which could only be revoked under the conditions set out in §§ 48 ff. of the Administrative Procedure Act, given that the declaration – similar to an internal instruction – was addressed to the Federal Foreign Office and thus did not have an external effect, which would be necessary for it to constitute an administrative act under § 35 first sentence of the Administrative Procedure Act (cf. also Berlin-Brandenburg Higher Administrative Court, Judgment of 4 June 2025 - OVG 6 B 4/24 -, […] paras. 32 ff.; Order of 2 March 2026 - OVG 6 S 59/26 -, […] para. 22).

61

This conclusion by the Higher Administrative Court is not objectionable under constitutional law. It is in line with the statutory conception of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act (see paras. 55 f. above) and the prevailing view in the case-law and legal doctrine (cf. Bremen Administrative Court, Judgment of 20 November 2020 - 2 K 3165/17 -, […] para. 32; […]). Based thereon, the declaration of admission of the Federal Ministry of the Interior substitutes the approval by the foreigners’ authority pursuant to § 31 of the Ordinance Governing Residence (Aufenthaltsverordnung – AufenthV) ([…]), which likewise does not have external effects ([…]).

62

In this context, the Higher Administrative Court was not required to examine the possibility of a ‘multi-level administrative act’ involving several authorities in further detail. According to the established case-law of the highest courts, which the constitutional complaint does not address, an act with the participation of several authorities – even if it is based on ‘incongruent competences of assessment’ – can only constitute an administrative act if, based on its statutory design and its meaning, it has direct external effects vis-à-vis citizens ([…]). This is a question of the relevant law, and the Higher Administrative Court’s interpretation of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act determining that this is not the case is not constitutionally objectionable.

63

In respect to the complainants’ argument that, from the recipients’ perspective, the declaration of admission of 14 September 2021 must be considered an administrative act based on the communications of the VA Office and GIZ (MRL Afghanistan and AFG-Pak Taskforce) from 2021 to 2024, they fail to acknowledge the Higher Administrative Court’s legal assessment of the declaration. The Higher Administrative Court assumes that the declaration of admission issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 14 September 2021 was not addressed to the complainants, but rather internal in nature and was thus only addressed to the Federal Foreign Office. This assumption is not constitutionally objectionable. It is true that the VA Office and GIZ notified the complainants of the declaration of admission. However, this does not make the complainants addressees of that declaration (cf. Order of the Higher Administrative Court of 21 April 2026, p. 13; see also Berlin-Brandenburg Higher Administrative Court, Order of 12 November 2025 - OVG 6 S 88/25 -, […] para. 4 with further references). In light of this, the communications of the VA Office and GIZ (MRL Afghanistan and AFG-Pak Taskforce) with complainant no. 1 could have, at most, created a separate legitimate expectation that must be distinguished from the declaration of admission of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (for more detail see paras. 64 ff. below).

64

c) The Higher Administrative Court was also not required to find that the correspondence of complainant no. 1 with the VA Office and GIZ (MRL Afghanistan and AFG-Pak Taskforce) created a tenable basis for a protected expectation that visas would be issued. The emails and messages submitted provide sufficient indications for the Higher Administrative Court’s assumption that they were merely for information purposes and did not declare admission or entail other legal consequences (cf. Order of 21 April 2026, p. 12).

65

It is not known through which channel and in what form complainant no. 1 was notified of the declaration of admission of 14 September 2021. The complainants submitted that a staff member of the Federal Foreign Office had presumably provided the notification, which had been passed on by a representative of the organisation ‘Women for Afghan Women’. The complainants submitted a document which, according to its header, was created by the Federal Foreign Office. However, the Higher Administrative Court was not required to find that this document established a basis for a protected expectation that visas would be issued. Its layout resembles an official information leaflet or guideline. It bears no date, nor is it addressed individually to the complainants. Rather, it is addressed to an unspecified group of recipients and contains the non-specific salutation ‘Dear Sir/Madam’. Following the heading ‘Subject: Approval for admission to Germany’, there is an introduction, which can be understood as an indication of the informational purpose of the letter: ‘I am contacting you to inform you that you have been granted approval for admission to Germany (…)’.

66

The subsequent emails sent by GIZ were individually addressed to complainant no. 1, but were even more clearly recognisable as mere information letters in preparation for the visa procedure. An email from GIZ (MRL Afghanistan) dated 6 September 2023 stated that the complainants had received a declaration of admission from the Federal Ministry of the Interior some time ago and were therefore entitled to apply for German visas. In an email from GIZ (AFG-Pak Taskforce) dated 7 October 2024, complainant no. 1 was advised – before she left for Pakistan – that a successful conclusion of the visa procedure was not guaranteed (‘Kindly note that admissions to Germany are granted on a preliminary basis and do not guarantee a successful visa application for Germany’).

III. 

67

In interpreting and applying the provisions of the Residence Act, the Higher Administrative Court did not fail to recognise the scope and significance of the general requirement of equal treatment under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law. The complainants are not entitled to be issued visas on equal treatment grounds.

68

1. The general guarantee of the right to equality under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law requires that the legislator accord equal treatment to matters that are essentially alike, and unequal treatment to such matters that are essentially different (cf. BVerfGE 168, 1 <48 para. 139> – Transfer of business assets between partnerships; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Senate of 23 July 2025 - 2 BvL 19/14 -, para. 69 – Minimum taxation; established case-law). In particular, a violation of the general guarantee of the right to equality must be found if a group of persons addressed by a provision is treated differently from another group and placed at a disadvantage in relation to this other group, although there are no differences between the groups that are of such nature or significance that they could justify the different treatment (cf. BVerfGE 104, 144 f.>), and no grounds for justification can be found that are appropriate to the extent of the unequal treatment (cf. BVerfGE 102, 68 <87>; established case-law).

69

Violations of this fundamental right are not limited to acts of the legislator. Such a violation also occurs when courts, in interpreting statutory provisions or filling gaps in the law, differentiate in a way that is not open to the legislator (cf. BVerfGE 58, 369 <374>; 65, 377 <384>; 69, 188 <205>; 70, 230 <240>; 84, 197 <199>; 101, 239 <269>; 115, 51 <61 f.>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 27 June 2018 - 1 BvR 100/15 inter alia -, para. 16; Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 5 August 2024 - 2 BvR 2002/20 -, para. 29 with further references). If the legislator could not create a legal situation corresponding to the outcome of the challenged court decision without violating Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law, the courts have failed to recognise the scope and significance of Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law (cf. BVerfGE 82, 6 <15 f.>; 115, 320 <367>; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 27 June 2018 - 1 BvR 100/15 inter alia -, para. 16; Order of the Third Chamber of the Second Senate of 5 August 2024 - 2 BvR 2002/20 -, para. 29 with further references).

70

Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law does not in its own right establish a right to be granted state benefits or other advantages. At least in conjunction with certain freedoms, however, Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law may give rise to derivative rights directed at equal participation in opportunities actually offered by the state (cf. BVerfGE 33, 303 <330 ff.>; 147, 253 <305 ff. paras. 103 ff.>; 170, 52 <69 f. paras. 40 f.> – Federal Training Assistance Act; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 9 August 2018 - 1 BvR 1981/16 -, para 10).

71

2. Based thereon, the Higher Administrative Court did not fail to recognise the scope and significance of the complainants’ right to equal treatment under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law – assuming that it is even applicable in the present extraterritorial constellation.

72

a) The different treatment of persons who have received approvals for admission under the Federal Admission Programme (Bundesaufnahmeprogramm) and persons – like the complainants – in respect of whom a declaration of admission was made in the context of the Human Rights List programme is not objectionable under the general guarantee of the right to equality under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law.

73

aa) Approvals for admission under the Federal Admission Programme and declarations of admission in the context of the Human Rights List are subject to different legal bases and there are fundamental differences in their legal effects.

74

(1) Approvals for admission under the Federal Admission Programme were granted pursuant to § 23(2) first sentence of the Residence Act. Under that provision, in order to safeguard special political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior may, in consultation with the highest Land authorities, order the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to grant foreign nationals from specific states or certain categories of foreign nationals defined by other means approval for admission. This provision distinguishes between the internal order and the subsequent external ‘approval for admission’. The internal order issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior has only indirect external effects by virtue of Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law, as a uniform admission practice is to be achieved in relation to a certain category of foreign nationals (cf. Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts – BVerwGE 141, 151 <156 paras. 11, 15>). According to the prevailing view in the case-law and legal doctrine, the subsequent approval for admission issued by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees vis-à-vis individual foreign nationals constitutes an administrative act, because it contains the assurance that a visa will be granted – as suggested by the statutory term ‘approval’ (cf. § 38 Administrative Procedure Act; cf. BVerwGE 142, 179 <189 para. 24> <regarding the approval for admission pursuant to § 1 Act on Measures Relating to Refugees Admitted in the Context of Humanitarian Assistance>; see also BVerwGE 141, 151 <155 f. para. 13> <discretionary decision of the Federal Office>; Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Judgment of 15 November 2010 - 19 BV 10.871 -, […] para. 16; Saxony-Anhalt Higher Administrative Court, Order of 13 February 2013 - 2 M 142/12 -, […] para. 11; Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Order of 12 November 2025 - 19 CS 25.1998 -, […] paras. 9 ff. <revocation of approval for admission>; Ansbach Administrative Court, Judgment of 26 January 2010 - AN 19 K 09.08002 -, […] para. 23 <discretionary decision>; […]).

75

(2) By contrast, the declarations of admission for the Human Rights List were made pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, which does not provide for any approval for admission specific to the affected foreign national. Rather, a temporary residence permit under § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act is to be granted if the Federal Ministry of the Interior or the body designated by it has declared that the foreign national is to be admitted so as to uphold the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the provision differs from § 23(2) first sentence of the Residence Act in that it is not aimed at the admission of groups, let alone at ensuring the equal treatment of members of a group, but merely permits admission on a case-by-case basis due to the specifics of the case (cf. BTDrucks 15/420, p. 77).

76

bb) It is irrelevant whether the complainants could have in theory received an approval for admission under § 23(2) first sentence of the Residence Act. In any case, they did not have an automatic right to be granted approval for admission (cf. BVerwGE 141, 151 <155 f. para. 13>). Under § 23(2) first sentence of the Residence Act, a right to equal treatment based on Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law is merely established in accordance with the actual administrative practice in applying [executive] orders (cf. BVerwGE 141, 151 <156 para. 15>). The complainants have not sufficiently demonstrated, either in the administrative procedure or in the administrative court proceedings, that this gives rise to a right of admission.

77

b) The different treatment of individuals within the scope of application of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act also does not result in a violation of the general guarantee of the right to equality under Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law.

78

aa) The complainants do not have a right to be afforded the same treatment with regard to the issuance of visas as persons who ultimately received visas based on a declaration of admission pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act that was not revoked. The complainants have not demonstrated that the same facts apply to the comparison groups as used in their case, nor is this otherwise ascertainable. In particular, they have not taken into account that the comparison groups are different in whether there is a valid declaration of admission at the time of decision on the visa applications. This difference is essential, given that the existence of a declaration of admission to uphold the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only statutory prerequisite in § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act.

79

bb) The complainants also have no claim to a declaration that the willingness to admit them will continue on the grounds that admission was declared (again) for other persons that may be or have been in a potentially comparable situation and – unlike in their case – was not revoked.

80

From the outset, the political decision on a declaration of admission pursuant to § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, for which the law does not stipulate further decision-making guidelines, is aimed at individual cases and is therefore not subject to a derivative right to equal treatment that involves a comparison of different cases. § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act does not provide for the admission of categories of foreign nationals defined by shared characteristics. Insofar as a visa is issued under § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, it involves an individual admission in each individual case that is made possible by the law. Due to the case-by-case nature of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, this does not constitute a benefit entitlement by the state in respect of which equal participation could be granted.

IV. 

81

However, the Higher Administrative Court failed to recognise the scope of the prohibition of arbitrariness under the rule of law, which follows from Art. 3(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law. This prohibits the Federal Ministry of the Interior – once the complainants concerned have been notified of a declaration of admission – from revoking such declaration without considering the complainants’ specific case and individual interests.

82

1. The legislator may grant the executive branch leeway (cf. BVerfGE 88, 40 <61>; 103, 142 <156 f.>; 129, 1 <21 f.>), the extent of which in principle is left to the determination of the courts (cf. BVerfGE 18, 85 <92 f.>; BVerfGK 19, 229 <235>) and is only subject to limited judicial review (cf. BVerfGE 129, 1 <23>). Even when the executive branch is permitted broad leeway, however, the executive branch can never have unlimited discretion under the rule of law. The executive branch is bound by general principles of the rule of law such as the prohibition of arbitrariness (cf. BVerfGE 18, 353 <363>; 21, 362 <372>; 48, 210 <226 f.>; 49, 168 <184 ff.>; 69, 161 <169>).

83

The executive branch exercises its leeway in an arbitrary manner if a decision is not in line with the purpose for which the decision-making leeway has been afforded, i.e. if it is based on irrelevant considerations (cf. BVerfGE 84, 34 <54>; 149, 407 <418 para. 30>; BVerfGK 16, 418 <435 f.>). If a law expressly subjects the issuance of residence permits to a given (foreign) policy decision, this may mean – in light of the particular rationale underlying political decisions and in view of the diversity and heterogeneity of conceivable political purposes – that the only purposes considered irrelevant and thus arbitrary are unlawful and evidently abusive ones. However, the scope of the generally broad leeway of the executive is narrowed when it exercises this leeway in favour of one specific individual and this individual is notified accordingly. The Basic Law lays down the concept of a state governed by the rule of law whose central elements are the guarantee of human dignity and every individual’s right to value and respect (Wert- und Achtungsanspruch); therefore, the state is obliged to recognise an individual as a legal subject with individual interests. The interests of the affected individual must be taken into consideration when continuing to exercise political leeway (cf. also BVerfGE 49, 168 <185, 188>).

84

2. Based on these standards, the Higher Administrative Court was permitted to assume that the Federal Ministry of the Interior was afforded broad political leeway and did not have to examine whether the Ministry’s declaration of revocation was tenable (see a) below). However, it should have found that the exercise of the leeway was objectively arbitrary because the declaration of revocation of 8 December 2025 was made without considering the complainants’ specific case and their individual interests had therefore not been taken into account (see b) below).

85

a) It is not objectionable that the Higher Administrative Court did not examine the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s political decision to declare the declarations of admission ‘invalid and expired’ with regard to the question of whether it is ‘reasonable in terms of foreign policy’ and whether ‘sufficiently comprehensible reasons’ were given for the decision. This is based on the constitutionally permissible interpretation of the statutory provisions by the Higher Administrative Court. According to this interpretation, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, in deciding on the admission of a foreign national to uphold the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act, has broad leeway, in particular due to the decision’s connection with foreign policy; in principle, this leeway does not serve the individual interests of the foreign national (cf. paras. 53 ff. above), which means that a foreign national has no right to sue for admission in the courts or demand a review of the correctness or reasonableness of a political decision if admission is denied (cf. accordingly BVerfGE 96, 100 <118>; 113, 273 <311 f.>). The same applies to the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s decision whether to uphold a declaration of admission issued or to revoke it.

86

b) However, once the complainants had been notified of an admission declaration, the Higher Administrative Court should have recognised that the revocation decision, in which the Federal Ministry of the Interior exercised its leeway, was objectively arbitrary, given that the decision failed to take into account the specific circumstances of the complainants’ case.

87

By completely ruling out any review for arbitrariness, the Higher Administrative Court’s assessment of the leeway afforded to the Federal Ministry of the Interior was flawed from the outset. Nor does the standard of arbitrariness applied by the Administrative Court, which was (subsidiarily) approved by the Higher Administrative Court, go far enough. The Administrative Court only reviewed the decision to revoke the previously declared admission of the complainants, of which they were notified, in view of upholding the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, and its review was in regard to the question of whether it appeared ‘simply untenable’. According to the court, this would be the case if the decision, in disregard of basic human rights, was unlawfully based on criteria such as skin colour or religion.

88

Based on the standards regarding the prohibition of arbitrariness set out above (para. 83), the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s political leeway narrows if it has stated that a political interest exists in relation to a particular foreign national, i.e. specifically in regard to this person, and that the foreign national has been notified of the declaration of admission. The Federal Republic of Germany must therefore recognise that it created the Human Rights List programme based on § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act – a provision which was specifically created for decisions relating to particular persons (cf. paras. 55 f. above). The specification initiated by the notification of the declaration of admission creates a link between the individual foreign national and the regulatory content of the general and abstract provision of § 22 second sentence of the Residence Act – whose central constituent element was met here, albeit only temporarily. Under these circumstances, such a declaration can no longer be revoked without considering the specific case. The Federal Ministry of the Interior must now take note of the individual situation of the foreign national concerned and take it into account in its decision.

89

A revocation declaration by the Federal Ministry of the Interior is possible and permissible even after an admission declaration was notified to the affected individual. However, it must be recognisable from the revocation decision that the individual interests of the affected foreign national in the specific case were taken into consideration. Apart from examining whether a decision was made on a case-by-case basis, courts are not required to examine, based on the legal criteria of proportionality and reasonableness, whether the general political interest or the individual’s interests are to be prioritised. In this respect, this examination differs from the one to be carried out when affected persons are deprived of a protected legal position in the context of the requirement of the protection of legitimate expectations (cf. para. 47 above). Furthermore, it is not the courts’ task to examine (political) revocation declarations as to potential mistakes in the balancing of interests. The way in which individual interests are weighed and considered is not subject to judicial review. As a political decision (taken by the government), the revocation declaration is subject only to political review; the executive branch must take political responsibility for the decision in Parliament (cf. BVerfGE 67, 100 <140 f.>; 146, 1 <39 f. para. 87>) and, as the case may be, justify it in public debate (cf. BVerfGE 70, 324 <355 ff.>).

90

Since the complainants were notified of the admission declaration of 14 September 2021, a revocation declaration by the Federal Ministry of the Interior is only permissible if the complainants’ individual interests have been taken into account. The blanket revocation declaration of 8 December 2025 does not satisfy these requirements, as that decision was taken without considering the complainants’ specific case (cf. para 25). The decision of the Higher Administrative Court of 16 January 2026, which bases the rejection of the applications for interim protection on the revocation declaration and fails to recognise the scope of the constitutional prohibition of arbitrariness, must be reversed. In its new decision, the Higher Administrative Court will have to examine the decision of the Federal Ministry of the Interior on the political interest in admitting the complainants in accordance with the above standards.

V. 

91

There is no need to decide whether the Higher Administrative Court additionally violated the complainants’ right to be heard under Art. 103(1) of the Basic Law or their right to effective legal protection under Art. 19(4) first sentence of the Basic Law. The violation of Art. 3(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(3) of the Basic Law is sufficient to reverse the challenged decision (§ 95(2) Federal Constitutional Court Act, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG; cf. BVerfGE 86, 122 <132>; 128, 226 <268>; 134, 141 <190 f. para. 144>).

VI. 

92

As a result of the referral of the case back to the Higher Administrative Court, it will have to decide – possibly by way of an interim decision – on the complainants' request that the Federal Republic of Germany temporarily continue to support them in Pakistan.

93

The Higher Administrative Court will have to assume a constitutional duty of the Federal Republic of Germany to support the complainants in Pakistan either until their visas have been issued or until the Federal Ministry of the Interior issues a revocation decision which is in line with the above standards. Furthermore, Germany will have to engage with the Pakistani government to prevent the complainants from being imprisoned or deported to Afghanistan. The Federal Republic of Germany supported the complainants, even though the complainants did not have any legal claim to such support, until it revoked the declarations of admission in an objectively arbitrary manner. The support provided was closely linked to the visa procedures, as it served to conduct these procedures. In view of this close link, the Federal Republic of Germany is prohibited from withdrawing its (voluntary) support based on an objectively arbitrary revocation declaration, which would make the act of withdrawal itself objectively arbitrary, especially as this would otherwise render the complainants’ right to a non-arbitrary decision meaningless.

C. 

94

The reversal of the matter and its referral back to the Higher Administrative Court mean that the orders of the Higher Administrative Court of 27 February 2026 and of 21 April 2026 are no longer valid and that the application for a preliminary injunction has become moot.

95-96

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