In the present case, there are, however, constitutional concerns arising from the fact that MHH has not, in fact, undertaken any development planning since 2005. Instead, basic questions are decided only within the scope of the agreement on objectives concluded with the ministry responsible for institutions of higher education (cf. § 1 sec. 3 NHG). Under § 63e sec. 2 no. 4 NHG, the power to enter into an agreement on objectives is assigned to the executive board; according to § 63e sec. 2 no. 4 in conjunction with sec. 3 sentence 2 NHG, the Academic Senate merely has the right to give its opinion. This means that there is in fact no adequate participation by the Academic Senate in fundamental decisions of academic relevance. Whether this is, in principle, consistent with the requirements of Art. 5 sec. 3 sentence 1 GG (cf. Gross, German Administrative Journal (DVBl) 2005, p. 721 <726 et seq.>; Trute, Journal of Academic Law (WissR) 2000, p. 134 <144; 154>; more cautiously Fehling, Die Verwaltung [The Administration] 2002, p. 399 <409>), is not a matter to be decided in the present proceedings, as the complainant has not challenged § 63e sec. 2 no. 4 NHG. The provisions as a whole are deficient, however, to the extent that they clearly permit the Academic Senate’s rights concerning development planning to be undermined. Arranging for the Academic Senate’s rights to participate in agreements on objectives between the institution of higher education and the state falls within the legislature’s discretion. The legislature may require consensual agreements or otherwise make it mandatory for the academically-relevant part of the agreements on objectives to be tied to development planning that is decided upon by the Academic Senate (cf. § 1 sec. 3 sentences 1 and 2 NHG). In any case, it must be guaranteed, however, that the Academic Senate is able to actually use its power to decide on, or its effective participation in, development planning; if necessary, this includes being able to force in court any necessary preparatory actions by the executive board. The lack of constitutionally-required participation of academics could insofar not be compensated for by their influence on appointing and dismissing the management body (C. II. 4. below).