The same holds true for the constituent element of “denial” of these crimes. Such an act crosses the boundaries of peacefulness given that, against the background of German history, the denial of the Nazi genocide – in terms of contesting that these commonly known events took place – can only be understood as the trivialisation of these crimes, which leads to the legitimation and approval thereof. Thus, the effect of denying these crimes is similar to that of their approval, which is generally sanctioned under criminal law pursuant to § 140 StGB (cf. BVerfGE 124, 300 <335>); it is furthermore equivalent to the glorification of the Nazi reign of violence and tyranny pursuant to § 130(4) StGB. Against the background of German history, denying the Nazi crimes of genocide is capable of provoking aggression on the part of an audience that thinks favourably of the speaker, and of inciting that audience to take action against those perceived as being the authors of, or responsible for, the purported distortion of an alleged historical truth implicit in such denial. It thus inherently carries the danger that the political discourse will turn hostile and violent. The denial of the Nazi crimes of genocide particularly endangers the peaceful political discourse not least because these crimes particularly targeted certain groups of persons or groups within society, and the denial of these events can and has been used, openly or insidiously, as a code to instigate hostile actions targeting these very groups. Against that background, it is consistent that the explanatory memorandum to the legislative draft qualifies § 130(3) StGB as a specific manifestation of the offence of Volksverhetzung traditionally recognised under criminal law. Thus, the regular courts can also assume in this case that denial of Nazi crimes evinces a disturbance of public peace. Special cases in which such effects appear to be unlikely from the outset and in which a disturbance of public peace can thus be ruled out can be dealt with by an adequate interpretation of this constituent element of the offence (cf. BVerfGE 124, 300 <339 et seq.>).