Order of 27 January 2026

R e a s o n s :

A. 

1

The constitutional complaint is directed against provisions of the Act to Improve Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, Arbeitsschutzkontrollgesetz – ASKG) of 22 December 2020 (Federal Law Gazette, Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl I p. 3334), which amended the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry (Gesetz zur Sicherung von Arbeitnehmerrechten in der Fleischwirtschaft – GSA Fleisch, hereinafter: the Act). In particular, the constitutional complaint challenges § 6a of the Act, which introduces a prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour and on cooperation with other business owners within the core activities of the meat industry.

I. 

2

1. The meat industry has changed significantly over the years. The number of traditional butchers has been falling, while industrial slaughter and processing for exports and discounters have become the norm. An increasingly critical public debate has emerged, which has focused not only on animal welfare but also on the situation of workers in the meat industry. The issues discussed include occupational health and safety, but also the accommodation, social security and remuneration of workers.

3

Since 2013, the industry has responded to political calls for regulation by, inter alia, trying to self-regulate, for example through a code of conduct for the meat industry in 2014 and a voluntary commitment in 2015 ([…]). The legislator initially addressed the shortcomings it continued to see in this industry with the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry of 17 July 2017 (BGBl I pp. 2541, 2572). Since then, this Act has contained provisions on the liability of businesses in the meat industry for social security contributions (§ 3), the obligation of employers to provide and maintain work equipment, protective clothing and personal protective equipment for their workers (§ 4), and the calculation and payment of wages (§ 5).

4

In 2019, focus inspections by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration for the Land North Rhine-Westphalia and inspections by the Monitoring Unit for Undeclared Work (Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit) identified many breaches in industrial meat businesses which concerned the subcontracted labour deployed there in particular. In the course of 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks occurred at several large abattoirs in North Rhine-Westphalia. As a result, political debate on a possible prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour and on cooperation with other business owners intensified once again.

5

In May 2020, the Federal Government set out the key parameters for further legislative measures. On 21 July 2020, a draft ministerial bill was drawn up, followed by a government draft bill on 29 July 2020, which was submitted to the Bundestag on 31 August 2020 as Draft Act to Improve the Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, Bundestag document, Bundestagsdrucksache – BTDrucks 19/21978). The Bundestag adopted the draft act with some amendments on 16 December 2020 (Bundesrat document, Bundesratsdrucksache – BRDrucks 745/20). The Bundesrat gave its consent by decision of 18 December 2020 (BRDrucks 745/20 <Beschluss>). The Act was signed by the Federal President and promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette on 30 December 2020.

6

2. A central element of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry is the prohibition on subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry, i.e. slaughtering, meat cutting and processing, which was phased in by Art. 11 in conjunction with Art. 2 no. 5, Art. 3 and Art. 3a of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act. As of 1 January 2021, the use of service contracts for these core activities of the meat industry has been banned. Between 1 April 2021 and 31 March 2024, the use of temporary agency workers was restricted and from 1 April 2024, it was prohibited altogether. In addition, the prohibition on cooperation with other business owners was intended to ensure that the owner of a business runs it as the sole owner, rather than together with others.

7

To this end, Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act inserted § 6a into the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry. In the version applicable from 1 January 2021 (cf. Art. 11 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) and challenged by the complainants, the provision initially read as follows:

§ 6a Restrictions on the use of subcontracted labour

(1) ¹An entrepreneur must run a business or, in the case of subsection (3) second sentence, a wider organisation in which animals are slaughtered, meat is cut or processed as the sole owner. ²The joint management of a business or a wider organisation by two or more entrepreneurs is not permitted.

(2) ¹The owner may only deploy staff in slaughtering, including meat cutting, and meat processing in the framework of employment contracts concluded with the owner or through temporary agency workers. ²The owner may not use self-employed persons for these activities. ³The permissibility of the supply of temporary agency workers in accordance with the first sentence notwithstanding, no third party may deploy any workers or self-employed persons for these activities.

(3) ¹The owner is the person who decides on the use of equipment and the deployment of staff. ²If, due to the business’s physical or functional integration into a wider organisation, the content and timing of its work processes are essentially determined by that organisation, the owner is the person who runs the wider organisation.

(4) A wider organisation is an inter-business production network, which need not be spatially contiguous, in which an entrepreneur essentially determines the content or timing of work processes relating to slaughter, including meat cutting, and meat processing.

8

Thus, as of 1 January 2021, § 6a(1) first sentence of the Act prohibits the joint management of a business or a wider organisation which works in slaughtering, meat cutting or processing by two or more entrepreneurs; under § 6a(1) second sentence of the Act, an entrepreneur must run a business or wider organisation (§ 6a(3) second sentence of the Act) which carries out slaughtering, meat cutting or processing as the sole owner (prohibition on cooperation).

9

As of 1 January 2021, § 6a(2) of the Act also bars businesses in the meat industry (cf. § 2 of the Act) from using subcontracted labour on the basis of service contracts for slaughtering, including meat cutting, and for meat processing (prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts). Staff carrying out these activities must be directly employed by the owner (§ 6a(2) first sentence of the Act) and may not be self-employed (§ 6a(2) second sentence of the Act). It is thus also prohibited to employ persons previously deployed through service contracts via subcontractors by concluding individual service contracts with these persons. § 6a(2) third sentence of the Act contains a corresponding prohibition on supplying workers on the basis of service contracts within the core activities of the meat industry.

10

Art. 3 no. 1 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, which is also challenged here, inserted a prohibition on the use of temporary agency workers into § 6a(2) of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry with effect from 1 April 2021 (cf. Art. 11 second sentence of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). Subsection (3), which was applicable from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2024, provided for temporary exceptions from this prohibition. The provision read as follows:

§ 6a Restrictions on the use of subcontracted labour

(1) (...).

(2) ¹The owner may only deploy staff in slaughtering, including meat cutting, and in meat processing in the framework of employment contracts concluded with the owner. ²The owner may not use self-employed persons for these activities. ³No third party may deploy any workers or self-employed persons for these activities or supply temporary agency workers for these activities.

(3) ¹In deviation from subsection (2) first and third sentence, a collective agreement between parties in the industry concerned may provide that the owner who is bound by the collective agreement may use temporary agency workers for meat processing up to a volume of hours worked per calendar year that, in total,

1. does not exceed 8 per cent of the total hours worked by the owner’s own employees in these activities in a given calendar year and

2. does not exceed the regular contractual annual working hours of 100 full-time employees working in meat processing who are employed by the owner.

²Third parties may only supply temporary agency workers if this is permissible under the first sentence. ³To determine the ratio set out in the first sentence, no. 1, hours worked in meat processing must be recorded separately in a tamper-proof manner in accordance with § 6. ⁴For such temporary agency work, the Act on Temporary Agency Work (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz) applies with the proviso that

1. in deviation from § 1(1b) of the Act on Temporary Agency Work

a) the temporary work agency may not assign the same temporary agency worker to the same undertaking for more than four subsequent months,

b) the undertaking may not deploy the same temporary agency worker for more than four subsequent months,

c) previous periods of assignment of the same temporary agency worker by the same or a different temporary work agency to the same undertaking must be fully taken into account if the deployments are separated by less than six months,

2. § 1(1b) third through eighth sentence of the Act on Temporary Agency Work is not applicable and

3. § 8(2) through (4) of the Act on Temporary Agency Work is not applicable.

⁵The owner must notify the customs authorities of the use of temporary agency workers in writing, in German, in accordance with the sixth and seventh sentence. ⁶Notification must be given before the start of the deployment of the temporary agency worker and promptly after the end of deployment. ⁷The notification must contain the information necessary to monitor compliance with the rules set out in the first through fourth sentence. ⁸The owner must promptly notify the customs authorities of any changes. ⁹The Federal Ministry of Finance can, by ordinance not requiring the consent of the Bundesrat, provide

1. further details regarding the necessary information to be provided in the notification and notification of changes,

2. for the electronic submission of notifications and notifications of changes, their format and technical organisational requirements, and

3. the authority responsible for receiving the notification and the notification of changes in accordance with the fifth and eighth sentence.

(4) (previously subsection (3)).

(5) (previously subsection (4)).

11

On 1 April 2024, Art. 3a no. 1 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, which is also challenged in these proceedings, entered into force (cf. Art. 11 fourth sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). It repealed § 6a(3) of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry, which had previously been introduced by Art. 3 no. 1(b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act. In the version in force since 1 April 2024, § 6a of the Act reads in relevant part as follows:

§ 6a Restrictions on the use of subcontracted labour

(1) (...).

(2) ¹The owner may only deploy staff in slaughtering, including meat cutting, and meat processing in the framework of employment contracts concluded with the owner. ²The owner may not use self-employed persons for these activities. ³No third party may deploy any workers or self-employed persons for these activities or supply temporary agency workers for these activities.

(3) (previously subsection (4)).

(4) (previously subsection (5)).

12

With effect from 1 April 2024, § 6a(2) of the Act has thus set out an extensive requirement of direct employment within the core activities of the meat industry (prohibition on subcontracted labour).

13

3. The prohibitions on subcontracted labour and on cooperation are supplemented by additional provisions. Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act inserted § 6b into the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry. It sets out powers of the customs authorities to monitor compliance with the rules in § 6a of the Act; in the version applicable from 1 January 2021 (cf. Art. 11 first sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act), it read as follows:

§ 6b Monitoring and powers of the customs authorities

(1) It falls to the customs authorities to monitor compliance with the rules in § 6a.

(2) §§ 2 through 6, 14, 15 through 20, 22 and 23 of the Act to Combat Undeclared Work (Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz) apply accordingly with the proviso that

1. the powers, obligations to tolerate and to cooperate set out therein are also applicable to owners within the meaning of § 6a(3) and persons permitting the use of a business or a wider organisation,

2. the authorities set out therein may also inspect employment contracts, records under § 2 of the Employment Documentation Act (Nachweisgesetz), bylaws, partnership agreements and other business documents which provide, directly or indirectly, information regarding compliance with the requirements under § 6a, and

3. those required to cooperate under § 5(1) of the Act to Combat Undeclared Work, including in conjunction with no. 1, must submit the documents pursuant to no. 2.

14

Art. 3 no. 2 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act subsequently added a second sentence to § 6b(1) of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry, according to which compliance with the restrictions on temporary agency work that came into force on 1 April 2021 was monitored by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). This amendment was repealed by Art. 3a no. 2 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act with effect from 1 April 2024 (cf. Art. 11 fourth sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). Since then, § 6b of the Act – insofar as it is challenged here – has been applicable in its original version.

15

§ 7 of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry was revised by Art. 2 no. 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act; in the version applicable from 1 January 2021 (cf. Art. 11 first sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act ), which was challenged by the complainants, it read in relevant part as follows:

§ 7 Provisions on fines

(1) A person commits an administrative offence if they permit another person, in whole or in part, to use a business or a wider organisation which carries out slaughtering, meat cutting or processing whilst knowing, or failing to know at least through negligence, that the other person

1. does not properly run the business or wider organisation contrary to § 6a(1) first sentence,

2. deploys a worker contrary to § 6a(2) first sentence, or

3. deploys a self-employed person contrary to § 6a(2) second sentence.

(2) A person commits an administrative offence if they, either intentionally or through negligence,

1. (…).

2. (…).

3. do not properly run the business or wider organisation contrary to § 6a(1) first sentence,

4. deploy a worker contrary to § 6a(2) first sentence,

5. deploy a self-employed person contrary to § 6a(2) second sentence or

6. deploy a worker or a self-employed person contrary to § 6a(2) third sentence.

(3) In the cases referred to in subsection (1) and subsection (2) nos. 3 through 6, the administrative offence may be punishable by a fine of up to five hundred thousand euros; in the cases referred to in subsection (2) no. 1, by a fine of up to fifty thousand euros; and in the cases referred to in subsection (2) no. 2, by a fine of up to thirty thousand euros.

(4) (…).

16

Art. 3 no. 3 and Art. 3a no. 3 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act supplemented this provision with regard to the phase-in of a prohibition on temporary agency work within the core activities of the meat industry with effect from 1 April 2021 (Art. 11 second sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) or with effect from 1 April 2024 (cf. Art. 11 fourth sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). According to those provisions, non-compliance with the prohibition on subcontracted labour and on cooperation within the core activities of the meat industry, whether intentional or through negligence, are punishable by a fine of up to EUR 500,000 (§ 7(2) nos. 3 through 6 and § 7(3) of the Act).

17

Through Arts. 8 and 9 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, which are also challenged here, the legislator also amended the Act to Combat Undeclared Work, essentially adding the unauthorised use of service contracts and temporary agency work to the catalogue of illicit employment (Art. 8 no. 1 and Art. 9 no. 1 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) and extending the monitoring tasks of the customs authorities and the obligations of those affected to tolerate and to cooperate with monitoring the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour and on cooperation (Art. 8 nos. 2 and 3 and Art. 9 no. 2 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). The challenged Art. 11 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act governs the entry into force of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry.

18

Pursuant to its § 2(1) second sentence, the Act applies to businesses in the meat industry within the meaning of § 6(9) of the Act on Mandatory Working Conditions for Workers Posted Across Borders and for Workers Regularly Employed in Germany (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz – AEntG). These include businesses or independent divisions which predominantly carry out slaughtering or meat processing or which predominantly deploy their workers in businesses in the meat industry. Pursuant to § 2(2) of the Act, §§ 6 through 6b of the Act do not apply to craft establishments with up to 49 employees.

II. 

19

According to its § 1, which has been amended by Art. 2 no. 1 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, the aims of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry are protecting the rights and entitlements of employees as well as occupational health and safety and preventing circumvention of obligations to pay social security contributions through the use of subcontractors in the meat industry. According to the explanatory memorandum to the Draft Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, its aim is not only to protect the health of workers in the meat industry, but also to protect public health (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 35). The memorandum states that the Federal Government’s intention in enacting the prohibition on subcontracted labour is to counteract ‘the opaque coexistence of a wide variety of different employment relationships’ (loc. cit., p. 3). According to the Federal Government, it is clear that meat businesses for the most part do not employ their own staff and permanently use subcontracted labour, in the form of service contracts and temporary agency work, within the core activities of the meat industry (loc. cit., pp. 2 f., 20). In some cases, entire stages of production, such as slaughtering, are outsourced to different subcontractors as separate tasks, sometimes using chains of subcontractors (loc. cit., p. 21). These groups of workers are for the most part integrated into the work processes of the meat business concerned, sometimes work together and carry out similar tasks (loc. cit., p. 21). The explanatory memorandum goes on to state that responsibilities are ambiguous, which often results in disregard for labour law and health and safety regulations. This leads to a large number of identified breaches and work-related accidents (loc. cit., pp. 20 and 25). In particular, the mass outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 at large meat processing plants have highlighted these shortcomings (loc. cit. pp. 20, 25). The explanatory memorandum to the draft act states (loc. cit., pp. 3, 25, 26):

‘In light of this, it is necessary to establish clear responsibilities in the meat industry. To this end, we seek to prohibit the use of subcontracted labour for slaughtering, including meat cutting, and meat processing. On the one hand, this is intended to provide workers in these areas with someone responsible who must ensure compliance with labour law and health and safety regulations; on the other, it is intended to allow for effective and efficient monitoring by oversight authorities.

(...).

Despite specific inspections and legislation remedying individual problems, there has so far been no significant improvement in the situation of workers in the industry. Therefore, the shortcomings that have become even more apparent under the realities of the COVID-19 crisis must now be addressed through a comprehensive approach. Especially for large meat businesses, whose structures have become completely opaque, this requires a prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour through service contracts and temporary agency work for their central business activity of slaughtering and meat processing.

This measure is designed to counteract abuse of service contracts and temporary agency work in the meat industry and bring about fundamental improvements for the enforcement of workers’ rights in the meat industry and for the protection of public health.

(...).

Business owners should no longer be able to involve third parties in order to evade their responsibility for the organisation of their operations.’

III. 

20

Complainant no. 1 is a partner in complainant no. 2, which he acquired in 2019 and which is part of a family-run group of businesses managed inter alia by complainant no. 1. Complainant no. 2 is a business that specialises in the cutting of pig heads. Before the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act entered into force, complainant no. 2 employed approximately 20 staff members, with half working in administration and the other half in production. However, these staff members did not cut pig heads themselves. Rather, they had management functions concerning loading, quality assurance and technical matters. The actual meat cutting was done by about 100 persons deployed at complainant no. 2 by two subcontractors on the basis of service contracts.

21

After the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act entered into force, complainant no. 2 concluded employment contracts with all persons who had previously been deployed there on the basis of service contracts. It hired a new staff member to administer these workers. The owner of a previous subcontractor was hired as a consultant to manage the workers, the majority of whom are from Eastern Europe.

22

With their constitutional complaint, the complainants challenge §§ 6a and 6b of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, § 7(1), § 7(2) nos. 3 through 6 and § 7(3) of the Act to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Meat Industry as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act as well as Art. 3, Art. 3a, Art. 8, Art. 9 and Art. 11 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act. The complainants assert that the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour and on cooperation within the core activities of the meat industry violates their fundamental rights under Art. 12(1), Art. 14(1) and Art. 3(1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG). In particular, they claim that the provisions are disproportionate because the legislator exceeded its margin of assessment and prognosis. With regard to the prohibition on cooperation and the supplementary provisions, they also assert violations of Art. 2 and Art. 9 of the Basic Law and of the requirement of specificity following from Art. 103(2) of the Basic Law.

23-39

[…]

IV. 

40

Statements on the constitutional complaint and the questions posed by the Federal Constitutional Court were submitted by the Federal Government, the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, the Free State of Saxony, the Federal Employment Agency, the Federal Association of German Sausage and Ham Producers (Bundesverband Deutscher Wurst- & Schinkenproduzenten e.V.), the Federal Union of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände e.V.), the German Butchers’ Association (Deutscher Fleischer-Verband e.V.), the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – DGB), the Association of Personnel Service Providers (Gesamtverband der Personaldienstleister e.V.), the Trade Union Food-Consumption-Hospitality (Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten), the Association of the Food Industry (Verband der Ernährungswirtschaft e.V.) and the Association of the Meat Industry (Verband der Fleischwirtschaft e.V.). Following these statements, the complainants expanded upon their submissions.

41

1. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs submitted a statement on behalf of the Federal Government.

42-54

[…]

55

2. The Land Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs submitted a statement on behalf of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia. […]

56-57

[…]

58

3. The Saxony Ministry for Social Affairs and Societal Cohesion stated, on behalf of the Free State of Saxony, that little attention has been paid to compliance with the provisions of the Working Time Act (Arbeitszeitgesetz) in slaughtering, meat cutting and processing. […]

59

4. The Federal Employment Agency essentially stated that no meaningful data was available at the agency or its integrated Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) regarding the situation in the industry and the effectiveness of § 6a(2) of the Act.

60

5. The Federal Association of German Sausage and Ham Producers, the Federal Union of German Employers’ Associations, the German Butchers’ Association, the Association of Personnel Service Providers, the Association of the Food Industry and the Association of the Meat Industry endorse the complainants’ view. […]

61

6. By contrast, the German Trade Union Confederation and the Trade Union Food-Consumption-Hospitality consider the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry to be constitutional. […]

62

7. The complainants made use of the possibility to comment on the statements by submitting a letter dated 5 September 2025. […]

B. 

63

The constitutional complaint is admissible insofar as complainant no. 2 asserts a violation of Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law as a result of the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, (§ 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and second sentence of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) and the associated fines in case of non-compliance (§ 7(2) nos. 4 and 5 and § 7(3) of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). For the rest – regarding § 6a(1), § 6a(2) first sentence, second alternative, § 6a(2) third sentence, § 6a(3) and (4), § 6b of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, § 7(2) nos. 3 and 6 of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act as well as Art. 3, Art. 3a, Art. 8, Art. 9 and Art. 11 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act – the constitutional complaint is inadmissible in respect of complainant no. 2. In respect of complainant no. 1, the entire constitutional complaint is inadmissible.

64

The complainants do raise an admissible challenge (see I. below). However, in part, the constitutional complaint was lodged out of time (see II. below), and only satisfies the legal requirements for demonstrating that the complainants have standing to the aforementioned extent (see III. below). Insofar as the complainants have standing, the principle of subsidiarity has been satisfied (see IV. below).

I. 

65

The constitutional complaint is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that some of the challenged provisions (Art. 3a Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) entered into force after the constitutional complaint was lodged (cf. Art. 11 fourth sentence Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). A constitutional complaint can be lodged against federal law that has been promulgated but not yet entered into force (cf. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE 1, 396 <410>; 104, 23 <29> for abstract judicial review proceedings; cf. also BVerfGE 163, 107 <122 f. para. 40> – Veterinary prescription requirement). The entry into force of the challenged provisions was only a matter of time.

II. 

66

The complainants lodged the constitutional complaint on 17 December 2021. With regard to the challenged provisions of Art. 8 no. 1(a) and (b), no. 2(a) and (b) and Art. 9 no. 1(a) and (b) and no. 2(a) and (b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, the complaint was not lodged within the one-year time limit set out in § 93(3) first alternative of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG).

67-68

[…]

III. 

69

Complainant no. 2 has standing insofar as it asserts a violation of Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law as a result of the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, (§ 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) and the associated fines in case of non-compliance (§ 7(2) nos. 4 and 5 and § 7(3) of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act). With regard to § 6a(1), § 6a(2) first sentence, second alternative, § 6a(2) third sentence, § 6a(3) and (4) and § 6b of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, § 7(1), §  7(2) nos. 3 and 6 of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act as well as Art. 3, Art. 3a, Art. 8 no. 1(c),no. 2(c) and no. 3, Art. 9 no. 1(c) and no. 2(c) and Art. 11 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, the complainants fail to sufficiently substantiate that they have standing.

70-98

[…]

IV. 

99

Insofar as complainant no. 2 has standing, its constitutional complaint satisfies the principle of subsidiarity following from § 90(2) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, which also applies to constitutional complaints that directly challenge legislation (cf. in this regard BVerfGE 150, 309 <326 ff. paras. 41 ff.> – Automatic number plate recognition in Baden-Württemberg and Hesse; 154, 152 <212 para. 78> – Surveillance of foreign telecommunications by the Federal Intelligence Service; 163, 107 <124 para. 43>). […]

C. 

100

To the extent that it is admissible, the constitutional complaint is unfounded. The admissibly challenged prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, (§ 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) and the associated fines in case of non-compliance (§ 7(2) nos. 4 and 5 and § 7(3) of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act) interfere with complainant no. 2’s fundamental right under Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law (see I. below). However, this interference is justified (see II. below).

I. 

101

The admissibly challenged provisions interfere with complainant no. 2’s fundamental right to occupational freedom, which is protected by Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law.

102

1. Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law is a uniform fundamental right that protects the selection and exercise of an occupation (cf. BVerfGE 7, 377 <400 f.>; 161, 63 <89 para. 43>, Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 ‑, para. 103 – Age limit for lawyers commissioned as notaries). ‘Occupation’ is any activity that is practised on a long-term basis and serves to create and maintain a livelihood (cf. BVerfGE 155, 238 <276 para. 92>; 163, 107 <133 para. 71>; 170, 377 <409 para. 66>). One manifestation of occupational freedom is the ‘freedom of enterprise’, understood as the right to freely found and operate a business, which also includes the freedom to design the business organisation and contractual relationships and to commercially profit from services provided (cf. BVerfGE 170, 377 <409 f. para. 66> with further references). The aim of the guarantee of occupational freedom is to have the least amount of regulation of occupational activity possible (cf. BVerfGE 163, 107 <134 para. 73>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 -, para. 103; established case-law). While freedom of contract with regard to contractual arrangements is also protected by the general freedom of action under Art. 2(1) of the Basic Law, this fundamental right yields as a standard of review when occupational activity is concerned (cf. BVerfGE 134, 204 <222 f. para. 67>; 171, 366 <402 para. 72> with further references – Act for the Financial Stabilisation of the Statutory Health Insurance System).

103

2. In light of the foregoing, occupational freedom not only protects the occupational activity of cutting pig heads carried out by complainant no. 2, but also its personnel management decision of having persons deployed on the basis of service contracts carry out this activity. This decision concerns its freedom of contract in the occupational sphere. The prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in meat cutting directly restricts complainant no. 2’s discretion in terms of personnel management and thereby its freedom to practise an occupation (see paras. 137 f. below).

II. 

104

This interference with Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law is justified under constitutional law. Restrictions of the freedom to practise an occupation are compatible with Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law if they have a sufficiently specific (cf. in this regard BVerfGE 49, 168 <181>; 134, 141 <184 para. 126>; established case-law) statutory basis, serve reasonable purposes of the common good, are suitable and necessary to achieve these purposes and do not excessively affect those practising an occupation, i.e. if they satisfy the principle of proportionality (cf. BVerfGE 7, 377 <405 f.>; 77, 308 <332>; 111, 10 <32>; 117, 163 <182>; established case-law).

105

In order to be justified under constitutional law, the challenged provisions must be formally and substantively constitutional (cf. foundationally BVerfGE 6, 32 <41>). There are no concerns regarding the formal constitutionality of the challenged provisions; in particular, both the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, (cf. Art. 74(1) no. 11 of the Basic Law), and the associated fines (cf. Art. 74(1) no. 1 of the Basic Law) were enacted in accordance with the legislative competences. The provisions are also constitutional in substantive terms. In particular, they satisfy the requirement of specificity, which follows from the principle of the rule of law, (see 1. below) and the principle of proportionality (see 2. below).

106

1. § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act and the associated fines in § 7(2) nos. 4 and 5 of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act satisfy the requirement of specificity rooted in the general principle of the rule of law.

107

a) Under this requirement, the legislator must draft provisions as specifically and clearly as possible, taking into account the particular nature of the underlying subject matter and the purposes pursued (cf. BVerfGE 49, 168 <181>; 134, 141 <184 para. 126>; established case-law). Affected persons must be able to understand the legal situation and adapt their conduct accordingly, and the administrative authorities implementing the law must be provided with standards that direct and limit their actions (cf. BVerfGE 110, 33 <54>; 113, 348 <375>; 128, 282 <317 f.>; 134, 141 <184 para. 126>).

108

A provision does not lack the necessary specificity simply because it requires interpretation (cf. BVerfGE 45, 400 <420>; 117, 71 <111>; 128, 282 <317>; 134, 141 <184 para. 127>; established case-law). As a matter of fact, the requirement of specificity is satisfied if problems of interpretation can be overcome by applying established legal methodology (cf. BVerfGE 17, 67 <82>; 83, 130 <145>; 127, 335 <356>; 134, 141 <184 f. para. 127>). It falls primarily to the bodies applying the law to resolve doubts arising in this regard (cf. BVerfGE 31, 255 <264>; 127, 335 <356>) and address problems of interpretation (cf. BVerfGE 134, 141 <185 para. 127> with further references).

109

b) The admissibly challenged provisions satisfy these requirements. While § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act contain indeterminate legal concepts – the terms ‘owner’ and ‘wider organisation’ –, accepted methods of interpretation can provide a reliable basis for their interpretation and application.

110

The Act provides a statutory definition of both terms in its § 6a(3) and (4). Moreover, the explanatory memorandum to the draft act contains sufficient indications for an interpretation specifying the provisions. The explanatory memorandum expressly points out, based on the purpose of the Act, that exercise of the employer’s right to issue instructions to certain employees is not sufficient for being categorised as owner within the meaning of § 6a(3) of the Act. Rather, to be categorised as owner, a person must make general decisions regarding staff deployment, including company working time (e.g. timing and duration of working hours and breaks, shift work, etc.) on the basis of the management of work processes, and must be able to control staff access to the premises for this purpose (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 37).

111

Guidelines for interpretation regarding the running of a wider organisation (§ 6a(3) second sentence and § 6a(4) of the Act) can also be derived from the explanatory memorandum to the draft act. According to this explanatory memorandum, the owner of the organisation must be the employer of all workers at any business involved in slaughtering, meat cutting and meat processing; however, it is not required that the owner’s rules on work processes in the respective businesses be predominant in terms of either time or content (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 37). The explanatory memorandum to the draft act gives an example that makes clear the legislative purpose to those working within the core activities of the meat industry and provides guidance for the interpretation of the provision: § 6a(3) second sentence of the Act covers constellations in which the business forms part of larger premises, but only a few processing steps are carried out there, or in which the volume or pace of work, or the time window within which the processing steps are carried out, are essentially predetermined, for example by the delivery of the raw materials (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, pp. 37 f.).

112

It falls to the bodies applying the law to resolve any remaining doubts. The provisions are not so imprecise – either as a whole, in part, or as regards individual terms – as to create intolerable uncertainty for those affected and to result in the courts being unable to apply the law in line with the rule of law (cf. BVerfGE 31, 255 <264>).

113

2. The admissibly challenged provisions are also proportionate. They serve at least one legitimate purpose (see a) below) and are suitable (see b) below), necessary (see c) below) and appropriate (see d) below) for achieving this purpose. It is in principle sufficient that the challenged provisions have a single constitutionally legitimate purpose (cf. BVerfGE 163, 107 <140 para. 89>). There is therefore no need to decide here to what extent the other purposes pursued by the legislator could justify the provisions (see e) below).

114

a) The prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, pursues at least one constitutionally legitimate purpose.

115

aa) Whether a legitimate purpose is pursued is subject to review by the Federal Constitutional Court (cf. BVerfGE 170, 293 <343 para. 113> – Statutory requirement of hospitalisation for coercive medical treatment). In principle, any public interest that is not precluded by constitutional law can be legitimate. Which purposes are to be considered legitimate also depends on the fundamental right that is subject to interference (BVerfGE 170, 293 <343 para. 114> with further references). In particular, it is not legitimate to set aside the very principle of freedom that is enshrined in the fundamental right concerned (cf. BVerfGE 124, 300 <331>).

116

bb) Based thereon, the legislator, in enacting the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, and the associated fines, pursues at least the constitutionally legitimate purpose of improving the occupational health and safety of persons carrying out these activities who were previously deployed on the basis of service contracts.

117

The prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, primarily serves to protect occupational health and safety. The legislator presumes that the serious breaches of working time rules and other occupational health and safety regulations identified during inspections in North Rhine-Westphalia and the comparatively large number of work-related accidents in the meat industry can be attributed to ambiguous responsibilities in the respective businesses, which deployed subcontracted labour on a large scale – in many establishments, it made up more than 50% of workers, with up to 30 different subcontractors at one production site. The prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts within the core activities of the meat industry is intended to ensure that responsibility for operational processes is aligned with responsibility for compliance with labour and occupational health and safety regulations in respect of all persons carrying out these activities (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 25). It is designed to shift owners’ business focus towards workers’ safety and protection of health (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 25).

118

This purpose is constitutionally legitimate. The legislator is entitled to pursue such purpose by virtue of its duty of protection following from Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law alone (regarding the protection of life and health cf. BVerfGE 161, 299 <362 f. para. 155> – Proof of vaccination <COVID-19>). The fundamental right to physical integrity may even require the legislator to provide for protection of staff from the harmful effects of their work (regarding night work cf. BVerfGE 85, 191 <212 f.>; 87, 363 <386>; generally BVerfGE 111, 10 <32 f.>; 138, 261 <285 para. 57>).

119

b) The prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, and the associated fines are suitable for improving the occupational health and safety of persons carrying out these activities who were previously deployed on the basis of service contracts.

120

aa) The criterion of suitability is met if there is a possibility that the provisions further the legislative purpose (cf. BVerfGE 161, 299 <367 para.166>; 170, 377 <421 para. 93>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 -, para. 121; established case-law). At the legislative level, it is sufficient that there is an abstract possibility of achieving the intended purpose (cf. BVerfGE 100, 313 <373>). A provision can only be found to be unsuitable if it cannot further the legislative purpose in any way or if it counteracts this purpose (BVerfGE 158, 282 <336 para. 131> – Interest on back taxes and tax refunds; 161, 299 <367 f. para. 166>; 170, 377 <421 para. 93>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 23 September 2025 - 1 BvR 1796/23 ‑, para. 121; established case-law).

121

bb) The prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, abolishes the separation of the organisation of operations and responsibility for staff. At the same time, compliance with labour law and health and safety regulations is now the sole responsibility of the businesses in the meat industry. They can no longer claim that subcontractors are responsible. The legislator could assume that the clear responsibilities arising from the provisions further the occupational health and safety of persons previously deployed on the basis of service contracts, because clear responsibilities are a prerequisite for the enforcement of rights.

122

Insofar as it is argued in the constitutional complaint that it is uncertain whether those previously deployed on the basis of service contracts even wish to take up a position at businesses in the meat industry or could obtain such a position, this is implausible given the consistent demand for such workers and is not supported by any factual evidence. Rather, according to the results of the evaluation carried out under § 8 of the Act, almost all persons previously deployed on the basis of service contracts have concluded an employment contract with businesses in the meat industry and are now directly employed by them ([…]).

123

Insofar as it is argued in the constitutional complaint that the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour only replaces one employer with another, leaving workers highly dependent on businesses, and that the actual problem is only shifted to a different level, exacerbating the situation of (foreign) workers, there is no reliable evidence for this assertion, which contradicts the actual findings established by the evaluation under § 8 of the Act in particular ([…]).

124

c) The interference with complainant no. 2’s occupational freedom resulting from the prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, is necessary for achieving the purpose pursued by the law – improving the occupational health and safety of persons carrying out these activities.

125

aa) Interferences with fundamental rights must not go further than is necessary to achieve the legislative purpose. A measure falls short of this standard if an equally effective means is available that would be less intrusive for fundamental rights holders and would not entail greater burdens for third parties or the general public (cf. BVerfGE 148, 40 <57 para. 47>; 170, 377 <422 para. 95>; established case-law; see also BVerfGE 103, 172 <184>; 113, 167 <259>). It must be clearly established that the alternative measure is equally effective in every respect for achieving the purpose pursued (BVerfGE 170, 377 <42295>). It is not for the Federal Constitutional Court to review whether the legislator has found the best possible solution for the issues the relevant law seeks to address (cf. BVerfGE 100, 271 <286>; 102, 197 <218>; 103, 293 <308>; 116, 202 <225>; 149, 86 <120 para. 94>). In consideration of the leeway afforded the legislator, the Court may limit itself to examining alternatives raised by the complainants or otherwise discussed by experts with regard to the question of whether they can achieve the purpose pursued more easily and in an equally effective manner while being less intrusive in terms of fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE77, 84 <109>).

126

bb) No less intrusive means in the aforementioned sense are ascertainable for the legislator’s aim of improving the occupational health and safety of persons previously deployed in the meat industry on the basis of service contracts. Neither the mere stepping up of inspections (see (1) below) nor an obligation to obtain a license for deploying workers on the basis of service contracts or greater responsibility for them (see (2) below), nor other individual measures introduced by the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act (see (3) below) or the general possibility of having recourse to the courts (see (4) below) constitute equally effective measures that impose lesser burdens on affected fundamental rights holders while not imposing greater ones on third parties and the general public.

127

(1) It is unclear if merely stepping up inspections would be equally effective. According to the legislator’s tenable assessment, oversight of the use of subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry causes particular difficulties, not least due to the opaque coexistence of different subcontractors and forms of subcontracted labour, the significant delays in being granted access to the businesses concerned and the fact that business records are often not available on site (regarding the then similar situation in the construction industry cf. BVerfGE 77, 84 <110 f.>). According to the findings from company inspections by the Monitoring Unit for Undeclared Work carried out from 2016 to 2020, on-site inspections of industrial meat businesses are generally difficult as these are mostly large and complex commercial enterprises that are protected by sturdy fencing, access controls and security firms. It is not possible to obtain unrestricted access without delays. In this regard, it is also an issue that the business records are frequently not available on site, but kept at the location of the domestic or foreign subcontractor or a tax consultant located a considerable distance away ([…]). In the context of the evaluation pursuant to § 8 of the Act, the Social Accident Insurance Institution for the foodstuffs and catering industry (Berufsgenossenschaft Nahrungsmittel und Gastgewerbe) made similar remarks regarding oversight of occupational health and safety prior to the entry into force of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act ([…]).

128

It stated that stepping up inspections to a level that would have good prospects of success would impose an additional burden, at least on the general public. Under the given circumstances, inspections would have to be expanded considerably on a long-term basis, which would require a significant increase in personnel and funds for the competent authorities ([…]).

129

(2) The possibility of requiring a license for the deployment of staff on the basis of service contracts in the meat industry raised in the constitutional complaint would not be an equally effective and less intrusive means. It is not even clear that it would be equally effective as it would not address the separation of control over operational processes and legal responsibility, which causes the gaps in protection. It is true that the possibilities discussed by experts for strengthening the secondary responsibility of meat businesses for the working conditions of staff deployed on the basis of service contracts within the core activities of the meat industry ([…]) – such as the proposal to expand core elements of the Working Time Act, of the Safety and Health at Work Act (Arbeitsschutzgesetz) and of the Workplace Ordinance (Arbeitsstättenverordnung) to staff deployed by subcontractors, thereby extending liability to meat businesses – would enhance legal responsibilities. It is plausible that this would have positive effects on occupational health and safety. However, it is not ascertainable that this measure alone, without additional inspections, could reliably achieve the legislative purpose in a manner that is as effective as a direct employment relationship. In particular, it would not bring about several of the changes to the general conditions envisaged by the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour, which, according to the plausible legislative concept, are all meant to contribute to improved occupational health and safety. In particular, legal protection for employees, i.e. enforcement of labour rights under private law, would not become easier given the lack of a direct contractual relationship with the business owner and the simple and quick replacement of subcontractors and workers would not be curbed (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 25). The measure could thus not have the same effect, envisaged by the legislator, of strengthening business owners’ focus on occupational health and safety (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 25).

130

(3) Contrary to the complainants’ submissions, other safeguards in the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act do not call into question the necessity of the prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting.

131

Firstly, this applies to § 22(1) second sentence of the Safety and Health at Work Act. According to that provision, which was inserted by Art. 1 no. 3(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, the competent authority may require that employers or those responsible submit the result of the coordination of the health and safety measures to be taken in accordance with § 8(1) of the Safety and Health at Work Act. While this provides additional safeguards regarding coordinated health and safety measures of several employers pursuant to § 8(1) of the Safety and Health at Work Act and responsibilities for enforcement, thus facilitating efficient oversight (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 33), it does not alter the shared responsibility for operational processes and occupational health and safety that causes gaps in protection. It therefore cannot be assumed that the competent authority’s right to receive information under § 22(1) second sentence of the Safety and Health at Work Act is reliably as effective for improving occupational health and safety as the prohibition in § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act ([…]).

132

The new obligation to directly record working time in electronic form in the meat industry (§ 6(1) of the Act) also does not render the provisions unnecessary. It is uncertain if this obligation is equally effective in ensuring compliance with working time regulations. Even before the entry into force of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, subcontractors had been required to directly record their employees’ hours in the meat industry under § 6 first sentence of the Act in the version of 17 July 2017 (cf. BTDrucks 18/12611, p. 127 f.), yet this did not resolve the shortcomings identified by the legislator. In any case, this obligation alone can at most ensure compliance with working time regulations, but cannot effectively address other shortcomings regarding occupational health and safety.

133

(4) It is not equally effective that persons who previously worked in slaughtering, including meat cutting, on the basis of service contracts can bring legal action to enforce their rights. While the courts do in principle provide protection to this group ([…]), the level of protection that can be achieved through individual lawsuits alone is not reliably as high as the protection that can be achieved additionally through the structural measure of imposing a prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts and the associated fines.

134

d) The prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, is also proportionate in the strict sense. It does not amount to disproportionate interference with complainant no. 2’s occupational freedom under Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law.

135

aa) For a measure to be appropriate, and thus proportionate in the strict sense, the purpose pursued by the measure and its likelihood of achieving that purpose may not be disproportionate to the severity of the interference (cf. BVerfGE155, 119 <178 para. 128> with further references – Subscriber data II; established case-law). In an overall assessment balancing the severity of the burdens against the importance and urgency of the reasons invoked to justify them, the limits of what is reasonable must be observed (cf. BVerfGE 152, 68 <137 para. 183> with further references; established case-law). The prohibition of excessive measures (Übermaßverbot) requires that the more severely individual freedom is restricted (BVerfGE 166, 1 <71 f. para. 155> – Child marriages), i.e. the more intrusive the interference with the affected fundamental right turns out to be (cf. BVerfGE156, 63 <142 paras. 271 ff.> – Electronic monitoring), the more significant the pursued interests of the common good must be.

136

bb) Based on these standards, the admissibly challenged provisions are proportionate in the strict sense. A moderate interference with complainant no. 2’s occupational freedom (see (1) below) must be balanced against high-ranking interests of occupational health and safety, which the legislator tenably accorded great weight (see (2) below), with the latter interests outweighing the former in an overall balancing of interests (see (3) below).

137

(1) The interference with occupational freedom is of no more than medium severity. The prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, only affects complainant no. 2’s freedom to practise an occupation. The prohibition merely sets out rules on staff organisation, which concern the way in which the occupational activities are carried out and are of medium severity.

138

The prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts does not set objective or subjective entry requirements for the activity of cutting meat (pig heads), nor does it prohibit this activity altogether (regarding the prohibition on the use of temporary agency workers in the construction industry, cf. BVerfGE 77, 84 <105>). In principle, the prohibition on subcontracted labour based on service contracts does not preclude the economic viability of the occupational activity. Contrary to the submissions in the constitutional complaint, the prohibition is also not tantamount to an interference with the freedom to choose one’s occupation as regards its effects in the present constellation (cf. in this regard BVerfGE 77, 84 <106>; 138, 261 <285 para. 54>). For employers in the meat industry like complainant no. 2, this could only be the case if the production conditions had deteriorated so much as a result of the statutory provisions that the operation of the meat cutting business were no longer possible at all ([…]). This cannot be established, neither for typical businesses nor for complainant no. 2. While the fines in case of non-compliance amplify the interference, it does not reach more than medium severity.

139

It is also not ascertainable that § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act as amended by Art. 2 no. 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act poses insurmountable challenges for businesses in the meat industry in the long term ([…]). The administrative burdens and increases in wage costs arising from the provisions are of medium weight. Despite the heightened requirements ([…]) that may exist in the industry in this regard, the same applies to the resulting loss of flexibility in recruitment and personnel planning (in particular to alleviate order peaks), which was emphasised in the constitutional complaint and by some expert third parties. The evaluation of the Act found that the direct employment of staff led to higher administrative burdens, in particular for larger businesses and, according to some businesses, to longer-term burdens to manage the directly employed staff ([…]). According to the evaluation, however, these were manageable burdens in terms of both time and substance. While businesses in the meat industry are required to pay at least minimum wage when they directly employ previously subcontracted labour, they no longer have to pay the agreed labour costs to subcontractors ([…]). There is no evidence to suggest that increased (personnel) costs and the loss of flexibility resulting from the prohibition have led to a significant loss of revenue ([…]). Nor could the evaluation establish that there was a lasting decline in production in the meat industry as a result of the amendment of the Act ([…]). Only in individual businesses did changes in staff organisation as a result of the amendment lead to short-term staff shortages and temporary declines in production ([…]). Overall, German production volumes are developing largely in line with those in the European Union ([…]). In response to the question what current challenges they were facing in 2022 and 2023, most of the businesses surveyed cited matters that were largely independent of the challenged prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts ([…]).

140

Nor is it ascertainable from the submissions in the constitutional complaint that businesses like that of complainant no. 2 had to cease operations as a result of the amendment. Rather, following the entry into force of § 6a(2) of the Act, it managed to directly employ all persons who previously worked for it on the basis of service contracts. Insofar as complainant no. 2 expects considerable financial losses and considers that § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act will jeopardise the existence of its family-owned group of companies, these predictions lack any recognisable substance, both in relation to its own business and especially as a general consequence (cf. also BVerfGE 145, 20 <81 para. 157>).

141

No different conclusion can be inferred from the complainant’s further submissions. The difficulties highlighted by complainant no. 2 with handling workers that are mostly from Eastern Europe relate to issues that are typical of the industry and do not result from the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts. These issues are now simply (more) directly faced by businesses in the meat industry. Yet this does not result in an inappropriate restriction of fundamental rights. There is no constitutional entitlement to benefit from one’s workforce without having to address the challenges arising from regular employment relationships. Ultimately, the highlighted issues are part of the risk born by businesses in the context of their freedom to conduct a business.

142

(2) The interference with complainant no. 2’s occupational freedom must be balanced against the occupational health and safety of workers in slaughtering, including meat cutting, who were previously deployed on the basis of service contracts, which are interests of the common good of generally exceptional significance (see (a) below), and which the legislator tenably accorded great significance and a degree of urgency in this particular context (see (b) below).

143

(a) The moderate interference with complainant no. 2’s freedom to practise an occupation must be balanced against the occupational health and safety of workers in slaughtering, including meat cutting, who were previously deployed on the basis of service contracts, which is a constitutional interest of great significance. It is rooted in the legislator’s duty of protection arising from Art. 2(2) first sentence of the Basic Law (in this regard cf. para. 118 above). The protection of life and health generally is a constitutional interest of exceptional significance (cf. BVerfGE 7, 377 <414>; 121, 317 <349>; 159, 223 <301 para. 176>; 161, 299 <362 f. para. 155>).

144

(b) The legislator assumed that serious breaches, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, of working time rules and other health and safety regulations had been committed in the past with regard to the area now regulated and that the comparatively large number of work-related accidents in this industry could be attributed to ambiguous responsibilities within the businesses concerned that result from their extensive use of subcontracted labour (cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 25; see paras. 19, 117). It is not ascertainable that the leeway accorded to the legislator in this regard (see (aa) below) is exceeded by this assessment of the risk (see (bb) below).

145

(aa) For laws that the legislator adopts with the aim of tackling situations that it assumes to endanger either the general public or the legal interests of individuals, the review conducted by the Federal Constitutional Court will include an examination of whether the assessment and predictions regarding impending dangers made by the legislator are based on sufficiently robust foundations. Thus, both the legislator’s assessment of the existence of such danger and the reliability of the foundations from which this assessment was or could be derived are subject to review by the Federal Constitutional Court. However, the Constitution also gives the legislator a certain leeway with regard to both questions, which limits the Court’s review (cf. BVerfGE 119, 59 <83>; 153, 182 <272 para. 237>; 159, 223 <298 paras. 170 f.> with further references). Depending on the nature of the subject matter in question, the significance of the affected legal interests, and the legislator’s possibilities to draw sufficiently reliable conclusions, the Court’s review can range from a mere review of evident errors to a review of reasonableness or even to a substantive review that is more comprehensive in scope (cf. BVerfGE 153, 182 <272 para. 237>; 159, 223 <298 paras. 170 f.>; 163, 107 <139 f. para. 88>). In the present context, namely legislation regarding the practice of an occupation, the legislator is generally afforded considerable leeway (cf. BVerfGE 145, 20 <73 para. 137>; established case-law). This leeway is particularly great when aims related to the economy, the labour market or social policy are pursued (cf. BVerfGE 109, 64 <85>; 138, 261 <286 para. 59>), and typically means that the scope of review is limited, and may be reduced to a mere review for evident errors.

146

(bb) The legislator has not exceeded the leeway accorded to it based on these standards. The legislator can plausibly base its assessment on concurrent findings of a 2019 investigation conducted by the health and safety authorities in the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as findings of the Social Accident Insurance Institution for the foodstuffs and catering industry and the Committee for Occupational Health and Safety and Safety Engineering of the Länder (Länderausschuss für Arbeitsschutz und Sicherheitstechnik). Additionally, the results of company inspections by the Monitoring Unit for Undeclared Work carried out from 2016 to 2020 and the project ‘Fair Mobility’ funded by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal Executive Board of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB-Bundesvorstand) also support the legislator’s assessment. The evaluation of the Act points in the same direction (see paras. 46 f. above). The arguments presented in the constitutional complaint do not hold, and no sound studies reaching a different conclusion regarding the situation, in particular as regards occupational health and safety, were put forward by expert third parties in the legislative process or in the constitutional complaint proceedings, nor is the existence of such studies otherwise ascertainable.

147

From July to September 2019, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia conducted an investigation into the working conditions in 30 businesses of the meat industry with more than 90 subcontractors and approximately 17,000 staff. In 85% of inspected businesses, a large number of mostly serious shortcomings in occupational health and safety were established, and 8,752 breaches were found overall. These included 5,863 individual breaches of working time regulations, 296 technical health and safety breaches and 112 breaches regarding the organisation of health and safety at work. In 2,481 cases, there was also a lack of occupational healthcare ([…]). While the businesses in the meat industry were typically responsible for technical shortcomings, the subcontractors were responsible for the breaches of working time regulations and the lack of medical check-ups. Breaches of working time regulations included serious breaches of maximum working hours on a given day ([…]). With regard to shortcomings in occupational healthcare, for example, no medical examinations relating to work in damp conditions were carried out, which are necessary to prevent permanent damage to the skin caused by the constantly damp working environment in meat processing. The same applied to activities in noisy environments in order to prevent irreversible noise-related impairment to workers’ hearing ([…]). The technical health and safety breaches and shortcomings in the organisation of health and safety were evident in the removal of technical safeguards, the incorrect handling of hazardous substances, locked emergency exits, blocked escape routes, dangerously worn and unchecked tools, and a lack of personal protective equipment, as well as the absence of risk assessments, training, operating instructions in the workers’ language and the absence of a company doctor or an occupational safety specialist ([…]).

148

These conclusions are supported by findings of the Social Accident Insurance Institution for the foodstuffs and catering industry and the Committee for Occupational Health and Safety and Safety Engineering of the Länder. According to information provided by the aforementioned insurance institution, more than 19,000 shortcomings were established in 2018 and 2019 during approximately 6,000 inspections of businesses in the meat industry (cf. BTDrucks 19/22723, p. 2; 19/21182, p. 6). According to its findings, the average number of work-related accidents per 1,000 workers in the meat industry is 65% higher than the average number in the other industries covered by this institution (cf. BTDrucks 19/21555, p. 10 ff.). With regard to subcontractors in the meat industry, the number of work-related accidents per 1,000 workers is almost double the average of all industries insured by the institution (cf. BTDrucks 19/21555, pp. 10 f.; 19/21182, p. 3). Even if it were assumed that these higher numbers can be attributed to the specific characteristics of this industry, as claimed in the constitutional complaint, it must be noted that in the meat industry the proportion of businesses with shortcomings identified by overseers from the aforementioned insurance institution was 66% in 2018 and 2019 (cf. BTDrucks 19/21182, p. 7). According to information provided by the Committee for Occupational Health and Safety and Safety Engineering of the Länder, inspections by the occupational health and safety authorities mainly identified breaches of the Safety and Health at Work Act, the Workplace Ordinance, the Industrial Safety Ordinance (Betriebssicherheitsverordnung), the Occupational Safety Act (Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz), the Working Time Act, the law on hazardous substances and the Maternity Protection Act (Mutterschutzgesetz) (cf. BTDrucks 19/22723, p. 2; 19/21182, p. 6). According to the Committee, it was also known from the practice of oversight authorities that only slight shortcomings in occupational health and safety had been documented in (the rare) cases in which businesses worked with their own permanent staff in production (cf. BTDrucks 19/21182, p. 3).

149

Finally, the results of company inspections by the Monitoring Unit for Undeclared Work carried out from 2016 to 2020 and the project ‘Fair Mobility’ funded by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal Executive Board of the German Trade Union Confederation also support the legislator’s assessment. A focus inspection carried out by the Monitoring Unit for Undeclared Work from 19 May to 18 June 2020 showed that non-compliance with legal requirements primarily affected workers employed by subcontractors ([…]). According to the monitoring unit, it is difficult, due to the complex legal relationships, to indirectly hold the businesses in the meat industry responsible, for example with regard to § 21(2) of the Minimum Wage Act (Mindestlohngesetz) ([…]). It is plausible that the same applies to breaches of the law regarding occupational health and safety.

150

The findings of the project ‘Fair Mobility’ are consistent with these considerations. The cases handled by support centres for workers from Central and Eastern Europe show that larger businesses in the meat industry have subcontractors carry out slaughtering, meat cutting and large parts of meat processing on the basis of service contracts and that the subcontractors responsible for occupational health and safety of contract workers barely complied with the requirements for protective clothing, caps, knives, face masks etc. or failed to do so entirely. According to these findings, ambiguous responsibilities for occupational health and safety increase the risks for workers ([…]).

151

Finally, the results of the evaluation of the provisions restricting the use of subcontracted labour in the meat industry ([…]) point in the same direction. In view of the restrictions faced by affected businesses with regard to the use of subcontracted labour, the evaluation aimed to examine whether and to what extent § 6a(2) of the Act could actually bring about the intended effects (cf. BRDrucks 426/1/20, pp. 15 f.). With regard to occupational health and safety, the report concludes that there had been a link between workers’ health risks and their deployment on the basis of service contracts, since the subcontractors responsible for occupational health and safety frequently had not accorded high priority to it ([…]). The positive change perceived as a result of the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts can inter alia be attributed to the fact that businesses in the meat industry are now directly affected by the (short-term) loss of a worker resulting from a work-related accident, while such accidents had previously not led to absences nor incurred costs for them ([…]). According to the report, the greater interest in accident prevention of these businesses is reflected in some businesses, for example, in the management and distribution of tools and personal protective equipment, training, reviewing and raising awareness of occupational health and safety among workers and the systematic analysis of the causes of accidents ([…]). According to the assessment of experts from the Social Accident Insurance Institution for the foodstuffs and catering industry, the fact that there was initially only a slight decrease in the number of injuries following the entry into force of the amendment can inter alia be attributed to the fact that a change in business culture takes time ([…]).

152

The arguments opposing this conclusion are ultimately without merit. Insofar as it is argued in the constitutional complaint that the legislator itself had conceded the lack of a sound factual basis in the explanatory memorandum to the draft act or in the context of the Federal Government’s responses to parliamentary interpellations, this assessment is based on an incomplete analysis of the relevant documents and the factual basis set out above. Insofar as it is claimed in the constitutional complaint that the legislator impermissibly based its actions on the identified shortcomings in occupational health and safety in businesses in the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, without having identified similar breaches in other Länder, it does not challenge the soundness of the factual basis as such, but only the conclusions drawn by the legislator. The complaint fails to recognise that it is not untenable for the legislator to base the adoption of a uniform federal legal framework on findings from company inspections within a specific region. Contrary to the further submissions, this is not altered by the fact that a dialogue has already been initiated in the affected Land between the Land government, representatives of the meat industry and other authorities with a view to addressing the identified shortcomings. The vague prospect of improvements in one Land does not preclude the legislator from creating a uniform federal framework addressing the factual basis in the exercise of its constitutional competences (see para. 105 above). The constitutional complaint calls into question the soundness of the factual basis for the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts on the grounds that the meat industry is no different from other industries with regard to the shortcomings identified by the legislator – in particular when it comes to occupational health and safety. This argument also does not challenge the factual basis as such, but only calls into question the legislator’s assessment made on this basis. The identified shortcomings are not disputed. Notwithstanding the fact that the results of several evaluations (see para. 148 above) do suggest that the meat industry ranks at least higher than average when it comes to breaches of occupational health and safety regulations, it would not be contradictory or untenable for the legislator to regulate an industry that does not rank at the top of the statistics with regard to the identified breaches. The Constitution does not require the legislator to only or primarily regulate the industries with the most breaches (cf. BVerfGE 138, 261 <286 para. 59>).

153

(3) (a) In balancing the burden resulting from the prohibition, under pain of a fine, on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in slaughtering, including meat cutting, on the one hand and its effect of promoting occupational health and safety on the other, the outcome is that the challenged provisions are appropriate. This follows from the legislator’s tenable assumption alone that the prohibition specifically furthers the protection of the health – an interest of high standing – of the workers in slaughtering, including meat cutting, who were previously deployed on the basis of service contracts, while resulting in interference of moderate severity in an area in which the legislator is accorded considerable leeway.

154

(b) The provisions also satisfy the constitutional protection of legitimate expectations.

155

(aa) Statutory provisions that, in themselves, limit occupational freedom in a permissible manner may still violate Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law in conjunction with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations if they do not provide for a transitional legal framework for those who have previously pursued a permissible occupational activity that will become impermissible in the future (BVerfGE 155, 238 <281 para. 108>). In this context, the legislator has broad leeway in creating transitional rules for existing legal frameworks, entitlements, and legal relationships. The Federal Constitutional Court only examines whether, in consideration of all relevant circumstances, the legislator exceeded the limits of what is reasonable in the overall balancing between the severity of the interference on the one hand, and the importance and urgency of the reasons invoked to justify the interference on the other (cf. BVerfGE 43, 242 <288 f.>; 131, 47 <57 f.>). A transitional legal framework, in particular the delayed entry into force of the new law, may be necessary not least in cases where compliance with new rules regarding the practice of an occupation requires time-consuming and costly changes to business operations and where the occupational activity that has previously been permissible would have to cease temporarily or could only be continued subject to unreasonable conditions in the event that the new law entered into force immediately (cf. BVerfGE 131, 47 <57 f.>; 155, 238 <281 para. 108>; established case-law).

156

(bb) In light of the foregoing, the protection of legitimate expectations did not mandate that the legislator create an (additional) transitional framework for the prohibition on the use of subcontracted labour based on service contracts in § 6a(2) first sentence, first alternative and § 6a(2) second sentence of the Act that goes beyond the regulatory mechanism in the challenged Act ([…]). It is not ascertainable that the change in conduct imposed from 1 January 2021 on businesses in the meat industry that previously deployed subcontracted labour on the basis of service contracts in their production processes constitutes undue hardship. In this regard, it must be taken into account that it was foreseeable at least from 31 August 2020 that the deployment of subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry would no longer be permissible. Notwithstanding the fact that political calls for regulation of the meat industry had been issued since 2013 and that the meat industry responded to these calls by trying to self-regulate, such as through the code of conduct for the meat industry in 2014 and a voluntary commitment in 2015 (see para. 3 above), the draft act was introduced into the legislative process by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in August 2020, following the publication ‘Key aspects for an occupational health and safety programme for the meat industry’ on 20 May 2020 (regarding the loss of legitimate expectations that the law will remain unchanged following the introduction of a draft act into the legislative process cf. BVerfGE 127, 31 <50>; 132, 302 <324 para. 56>).

157

It must also be taken into account that the prohibition on subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry entered into force incrementally (as also pointed out by the legislator, cf. BTDrucks 19/21978, p. 36). While businesses in the meat industry were barred from deploying staff on the basis of service contracts in slaughtering, meat cutting and processing from 1 January 2021, the use of subcontracted labour was still permitted in the meat industry for these activities. The meat industry could continue to use temporary agency workers pursuant to the Act on Temporary Agency Work until 1 April 2021, and, under certain conditions, until 31 March 2024. Only from 1 April 2024 was the prohibition on subcontracted labour within the core activities of the meat industry extended to temporary agency work. Thus, affected businesses had at least several months, and under certain conditions even more than three years, to adapt their structures and business model to the change in the law. There are no indications that this period was too short, nor does the outcome of the evaluation of the Act suggest that this is the case. Moreover, when transitioning to a new legal regime or changing the law, the legislator is not constitutionally required to shield those affected from any burden or to counter any special burdens that may arise through a transitional legal framework (cf. BVerfGE 131, 47 <57>), especially since the meat industry – including according to the submissions of complainant no. 2 – is an industry characterised by high staff turnover and order fluctuations and is therefore subject to constant change anyway ([...]).

158

Finally, the argument that investments – such as the acquisition of complainant no. 2 by complainant no. 1 – were made on the basis of certain expectations regarding business development, and that it is uncertain if these expectations can be realised under the Occupational Health and Safety Oversight Act, does not hold. Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law does not protect legitimate expectations on the basis of frustrated investments or an unlimited entitlement to recoup investments (cf. BVerfGE 145, 20 <94 para. 189>; 155, 238 <282 para. 110>). Such investments were not prompted by the legislator or the competent authorities. Rather, they were made at the business owners’ own risk (cf. BVerfGE 145, 20 <94 para. 189>). Ultimately, the expectation that the legal framework of an occupational activity remains unchanged is not protected under constitutional law (cf. BVerfGE 131, 47 <57 f.>; 143, 246 <383 para. 372>; 155, 238 <288 f. paras. 123 ff.>).

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e) Given that the interference is justified by the interest in furthering occupational health and safety, there is no need to decide here to what extent the other aims pursued by the legislator, namely the enforcement of other labour rights, the improvement of the effectiveness of inspections and the protection of public health, either by themselves or in combination, could justify the interference with occupational freedom under constitutional law.