Judgment of 16 November 2026
1 BvR 1803/22 inter alia
Subscription contracts for telecommunication services
In a judgment pronounced today, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court rejected constitutional complaints from telecommunication service providers challenging a law that grants landlords of residential buildings the right to terminate long-term subscription contracts for telecommunication services.
The complainants allege that the right to terminate violates their fundamental rights of freedom of property and occupation in particular. They also assert a violation of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the prohibition against retroactivity.
The interference with the network operators’ freedom of property is a permissible determination of the content and limits of property and satisfies the principle of proportionality; it also does not violate the prohibition against retroactivity. The same applies with regard to the interference with occupational freedom and the general freedom of action.
Facts of the case:
The constitutional complaints directly challenge the right to terminate under § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz – TKG), which entered into force on 1 December 2021. This provision affects subscription contracts between landlords and telecommunication service providers for the provision of telecommunication services to buildings and residences (via communal antennas or broadband distribution equipment) concluded prior to 1 December 2021. The law provides all parties to such subscription contracts with the right to terminate the contract effective 1 July 2024 without a notice period, so long as there is no contractual provision to the contrary. In the case of termination, the provision rules out all claims for damages by the other contracting party.
The right to terminate originated from a change in the Operating Costs Ordinance (Betriebskostenverordnung) implemented by the Telecommunications Modernisation Act (Telekommunikationsmodernisierungsgesetz) that entered into force on 1 December 2021. Prior to the change in the law, the Operating Costs Ordinance permitted landlords of residential buildings to pass on most of the maintenance costs for communal antennas or private broadband distribution equipment to tenants as operating costs. This rule, which from the point of view of landlords was known as a ‘service charge privilege’, had its origins in the 1970s. It was intended to prevent so-called ‘satellite dish forests’ on the rooftops of rental buildings and to support the rollout of a cable network. The rule, which affected over 12 million rental agreements in Germany, had been subject to criticism for some time. In particular, the Monopolies Commission (Monopolkommission) advocated for the elimination of the ‘service charge privilege’, citing the lack of transparency and choice for tenants, as well as its anti-competitive effects. With the change to the Operating Costs Ordinance, the ability of landlords to pass on the costs of telecommunications equipment in a residential rental building was largely eliminated as of 30 June 2024.
Key considerations of the Senate:
Insofar as the constitutional complaints are admissible, they are unfounded.
I. The freedom of property arising from Art. 14(1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) is not violated. The right to terminate pursuant to § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, as a determination of the content and limits of property, does interfere with property of the complainants that is subject to protection under Art. 14(1) of the Basic Law. However, this interference is justified under constitutional law.
1. The protection of the freedom of property extends not only to in rem rights or other rights enforceable against others, but also to choses in action that can only be fulfilled in the future, at least to the extent that they constitute an established legal interest.
The existing subscription contracts, which entail future obligations, granted the complainants an established legal interest.
2. § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, as a determination of the content and limits of property, serves the constitutionally legitimate aim of regulating the effect of the elimination of the ability to pass on the costs of a subscription contract on the relationship between the contracting parties and as such is not inappropriate.
a) In determining the content and limits of property, the legislator is accorded leeway to design which becomes broader the more the property in question has a social connection and provides a social function. In considering the constitutional protection of the freedom of property, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which arises from the rule of law, must also be taken into account.
The legislator possesses broad leeway to design the transitional legal framework in the context of changes to the system and restructuring the law. In particular, the Constitution does not require the legislator to spare concerned persons from all burdens or to address every special burden with a transitional provision. In regard to the redesign of complex regulatory systems, the Federal Constitutional Court only examines whether, in consideration of all relevant circumstances, the legislator exceeded the limits of what is reasonable in the overall balancing of the severity of the interference on the one hand, and the weight and urgency of the reasons invoked to justify the interference on the other.
b) With § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, the legislator pursues the constitutionally legitimate aim of regulating the effect of the elimination of the ability to pass on the costs of a subscription contract for those contracts between landlords and network providers, following its changes to the law with regard to the ability to pass on operating costs of a communal antenna or private broadband equipment.
The law authorising the right to terminate serves above all the interests of landlords who – unlike the network providers as a general rule – would have an interest in terminating the subscription contracts after the elimination of the ability to pass on the costs of the contracts.
c) The legislator’s allocation of burdens to the detriment of the network operators is not inappropriate.
In this regard, the legislator had broad leeway to design. This follows from the fact that the property at issue concerns future obligations arising from the subscription contracts subject to the right to terminate which have a social connection due to their relationship to the provision of broadcast services to tenants. The social connection also follows from the character of the affected obligations as possibilities that were created by the law on operating costs and the fact that the legislator was permitted to view the existing framework as disadvantageous for tenants and for competition. Furthermore, providing households with telecommunication services is an area that is rapidly changing. There are also the fundamental rights interests of the landlords to consider.
Given these circumstances, the legislator did not exceed the limits of its leeway to design, despite the extensive reallocation of burdens to the network operators.
The legislator could cite as support for its decision the fact that the subscription contracts were closely associated with the soon to be eliminated ability to pass on operating costs, so that it could link the creation of the right to terminate, at least as a starting point, to existing assessments under the ordinary law, that through the subscription contracts, the network operators have benefited from the direct advantage in the contractual structure made possible by the law on operating costs, that following a termination authorised by § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, landlords would have no remaining legal benefit, that network operators were granted a transitional period and that giving priority to private contractual terms would mitigate the burden on network operators.
d) The interference is also not made inappropriate due to a violation of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or the constitutional limits of retroactivity.
Like the principle of legitimate expectations generally the protection from retroactive application of laws under Art.14(1) of the Basic Law has taken on a distinct form. The right to terminate must be assessed according to the applicable standards for quasi retroactive interferences with property. In the case of a termination authorised by § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, the contractual exchange of services is cancelled prospectively, so that the creation of the right of termination diminishes the value of the future obligations which have already-existing protection as property.
The interference with the network operators’ property interest that arose through prior law is justified by reasons of such weight that they outweigh the expectation of the continuation of the property interest.
While the network operators have made investments in reliance on the subscription contracts, even a specific expectation that the existing legal framework will continue to apply with action in reliance on this expectation does not generally result in a protection that is exempt from a balancing of interests. With an ever increasing time period between the conclusion of the contract and the services to be delivered, it becomes increasingly less rational – even when the parties have an interest in a long term agreement – to rely on the continuation of the existing legal framework, and more rational to reach contractual agreements that allocate the risk of future changes to the law. In addition, the longer the contracts ran, the less the network operators’ expectation merited protection, and the more the network operators should have made contractual arrangements for a change in the law.
On this basis, the legislator was permitted, in balancing the interests, to conclude that the transitional period provided for § 230(5) first sentence of the Telecommunications Act sufficiently took the network operators’ interest into account. The protected interest was eliminated with the adoption of the legislation by the Bundestag on 22 April 2021, meaning that the legislator gave the network operators a transitional period which ended on 30 June 2024, thus ensuring a minimum contractual extension of more than three years, regardless of the specific circumstances. This is still within the limits of the legislator’s leeway of design.
II. § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act does not violate the occupational freedom guaranteed under Art. 12(1) of the Basic Law.
Insofar as the right to terminate has effects on the network operators’ business model, this only affects their occupational freedom; however, this freedom is not violated.
Given the close relationship between the subscription contracts and the ability to pass on the costs associated with such contracts, the legislator could assume that the foundation for the network operators’ business model that was built on the prior contractual arrangements was not taken away through § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act, but rather through the prior elimination of the ability to pass on costs. It was permitted to assume that following the elimination of the ability to pass on the costs of a subscription contract, an extension of such a contract or the conclusion of a new contract would not be expected. Thus, the burden arising from § 230(5) of the Telecommunications Act lies ‘merely’ – in light of the business model – in that the network operators might have had to adjust to the new legal framework at an earlier stage. This burden is justified, not only for the same reasons as the interference with the rights arising from Art. 14(1) of the Basic Law, but also because it expands tenants’ freedom of choice and speeds up the change in the system.